Deficits of Japanese Nuclear Risk Governance Remaining After the Fukushima Accident: Case of Contaminated Water Management

Abstract

It was found that many deficits of nuclear risk governance in Japan before and after the Fukushima accident. Not only were they created and embedded before the Fukushima disaster, but it has been remained or even worsened even after many accident reports were published and pointed out many problems and suggested ideas to remedy them.In this paper, the author would analyze such remained problems found in the postaccident "on-site management" policy and measures, taking the case of contaminated water management at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Firstly, the development of contaminated water management policy measures and institutional framework would be described in a chronological manner, which is one of the most typical and difficult tasks of "on-site management." Then, the cause of their failure trajectory would be analyzed by using a sociological concept "structural disaster" to understand the malfunctions which are continuously repeated not by identifiable particular factors but by inappropriate design of the socio-technical interface. This conceptual standpoint would suggest that the problems are not solvable by each of technical improvement, superficial institutional reform, nor prosecution and punishment of relevant individuals or organizations but by the redesign of that interface as a whole. Finally, based on this perspective, the author would discuss the ideas to remedy the deficits that might lead to further continuation of "structural disaster" in nuclear field.

Why Is It so Difficult to Learn from Accidents?

“…Acknowledgements Part of this chapter is based on the author's recently published and forthcoming book chapters [3,16] and supported by the JSPS (Japan Society for Promotion of Science) academic funding program "Higashi-Nihon Dai-shinsai Gakujutsu Chousa" (Academic Survey Program for Great East Japan Disaster).…”