Defining Determinism

Müller, Thomas; Placek, Tomasz

doi:10.1093/bjps/axv049

Cited by 20 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…A similar idea in the context of the theory of branching spacetimes has been developed by[27][28][29][30]: the models of the branching spacetime axioms are non-Hausdorff, but histories (i.e., constructs representing single spacetimes) are Hausdorff 13. Therefore, we obtain here indeterminism in two senses: global for whole spacetimes and local for geodesics; for more on this distinction, see[31,32].…”

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confidence: 82%

Generalised Manifolds as Basic Objects of General Relativity

Luc

2019

Found Phys

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In this paper non-Hausdorff manifolds as potential basic objects of General Relativity are investigated. One can distinguish four stages of identifying an appropriate mathematical structure to describe physical systems: kinematic, dynamical, physical reasonability, and empirical. The thesis of this paper is that in the context of General Relativity, non-Hausdorff manifolds pass the first two stages, as they enable one to define the basic notions of differential geometry needed to pose the problem of the evolution-distribution of matter and are not in conflict with the Einstein equations. With regard to the third stage, various potential conflicts with physical reasonability conditions are considered with a tentative conclusion that non-Hausdorff manifolds are more likely to pass this stage than is typically assumed. When dealing with some of these problems, the modal interpretation of non-Hausdorff manifolds is invoked, according to which they represent bundles of alternative possible spacetimes rather than single spacetimes.

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confidence: 82%

Generalised Manifolds as Basic Objects of General Relativity

Luc

2019

Found Phys

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“…(Butterfield 2005). This definition can be amended in cases where gauge freedom complicates the notion of state (Müller and Placek 2018). 11 In dissipative systems, multiple states might all end on the same attractor and so are unique only up until then.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Divine Action, Determinism, and the Laws of Nature

Koperski¹

2019

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A longstanding question at the intersection of science, philosophy, and theology is how God might act, or not, when governing the universe. Many believe that determinism would prevent God from acting at all, since to do so would require violating the laws of nature. However, when a robust view of these laws is coupled with the kind of determinism now used in dynamics, a new model of divine action emerges. This book presents a new approach to divine action beyond the current focus on quantum mechanics and esoteric gaps in the causal order. It bases this approach on two general points: First, that there are laws of nature is not merely a metaphor. Second, laws and physical determinism are now understood in mathematically precise ways that have important implications for metaphysics. The explication of these two claims shows not only that nonviolationist divine action is possible but also that there is considerably more freedom available for God to act than that which current models allow. By bringing a philosophical perspective to an issue often dominated by theologians and scientists, this book redresses an imbalance in the discussion around divine action. It will therefore be of keen interest to scholars of philosophy and religion, the philosophy of science, and theology.

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“…3 See, e.g., Butterfield (2005) and Earman (2006). See Müller (2015) and Müller and Placek (2018) for discussion. 4 If a state is not specified via intrinsic properties, a verdict of determinism can be spurious.…”

Section: Determinism and Indeterminismmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Stochastic Process Model for Free Agency under Indeterminism

Müller

Briegel

2018

Dialectica

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The aim of this paper is to establish that free agency, which is a capacity of many animals including human beings, is compatible with indeterminism: an indeterministic world allows for the existence of free agency. The question of the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism is less discussed than its mirror image, the question of the compatibility of free agency and determinism. It is, however, of great importance for our self‐conception as free agents in our (arguably) indeterministic world. We begin by explicating the notions of indeterminism and free agency and by clarifying the interrelation of free agency and the human‐specific notion of free will. We then situate our claim of the compatibility of free agency and indeterminism precisely in the landscape of the current debate on freedom and determinism, exposing an unhappy asymmetry in that debate. Then we proceed to make our case by describing the mathematically precise, physically motivated model of projective simulation, which employs indeterminism as a central resource for agency modeling. We argue that an indeterministic process of deliberation modeled by the dynamics of projective simulation can exemplify free agency under indeterminism, thereby establishing our compatibility claim: Free agency can develop and thrive in an indeterministic world.

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Defining Determinism

Cited by 20 publications

References 25 publications

Generalised Manifolds as Basic Objects of General Relativity

Generalised Manifolds as Basic Objects of General Relativity

Divine Action, Determinism, and the Laws of Nature

A Stochastic Process Model for Free Agency under Indeterminism

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