Defining Traits Differently for Self and Others

Abstract

Identical trait labels may be understood differently in thinking about self and in thinking about others. Specifically, when making self-judgments, individuals define traits primarily in terms of unobservable manifestations, e.g., how one feels. However, in making other-judgments, particularly in making judgments about relatively unfamiliar others, individuals define traits primarily in terms of observable manifestations, e.g., how one looks. This prediction was tested in three experiments (Exp. 1: N = 96, Polish undergraduates including 19 men, 77 women; Exp. 2: N = 96, U.S. undergraduates including 18 men, 78 women; Exp. 3: N = 74, Polish undergraduates including 18 men, 56 women). Participants were asked to perform a generic trait judgment task followed by a specific trait judgment task in which the same traits were preceded by a qualifier "feels" or "looks". As expected, in the case of self-judgments, generic judgments predicted feels judgments better than looks judgments. This pattern did not occur for judgments of others and was reversed for judgments about others who were relatively unfamiliar.

Observable and Unobservable Aspects of Traits in Self—Other Comparisons

“…Specifi cally, the self is considered relatively more in light of unobservable aspects of a given trait, while the other is considered more in light of the observable aspects. This fi nding is consis-tent with the results of previous research ( Niewiarowski & Karylowski, 2008 ) showing that traits are defi ned diff erently when people make separate trait-judgments for self and for others. Furthermore, it underscores the pervasiveness of the tendency to conceptualize traits diff erently for self versus others.…”

“…This is presumably because, compared to one's representations of mere acquaintances, one's representations of friends include proportionately more-and more easily accessible-data on their unobservable characteristics. This is consistent with results of previous research in which representations of acquaintances and signifi cant others were compared ( Andersen, et al ., 1998 ;Niewiarowski & Karylowski, 2008 ;Vazire, 2010 ;Andersen & Przybylinski, 2013 ). What remains unclear is to what extent the fi ndings are due simply to the greater familiarity of signifi cant others (including friends) and to what extent it is the emotional closeness that is responsible for the eff ect.…”

“…Trait labels are frequently ambiguous with respect to the distinction between internal and observable versus external and unobservable characteristics. Accordingly, Karylowski and associates (Karylowski & Ranieri, 2006 ;Niewiarowski & Karylowski, 2008 ;Mrozinski & Karylowski, 2011 ) have proposed that the same trait label might be interpreted diff erently when applied to self compared to when applied to others. For instance, when applied to self judgments, happy will be interpreted primarily in terms of feeling happy .…”

Time Frame Affects Vantage Point in Episodic and Semantic Autobiographical Memory: Evidence from Response Latencies

“…Without such resolution incompatibility between the mental representations of self and mental representations of others would be likely to hinder one’s ability to use self as a guide or a point of comparison in making judgments about other people (Karylowski et al, 2000; Karylowski and Ranieri, 2006). It could also result in biased comparative self-other judgments because different definitions of the same characteristics (more internally based in the case of the perceived self vs. more externally based in the case of the perceived other) would be used when considering one’s own standing vs. the other person’s standing (Niewiarowski and Karylowski, 2008, 2015). …”