2017
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-017-0925-2
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Definite descriptions and negative existential quantifiers

Abstract: Previous theorists have claimed that Russell's theory of definite descriptions gives the wrong truth conditions to sentences in which definite descriptions are embedded under certain other operators; but the other operators used, such as conditionals and propositional attitude verbs, have introduced intensional and hyperintensional complications that might be thought to obscure the point against Russell. This paper shows that the same kind of problem arises when the operator in question (English 'no') allows t… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Here we will not further pursue this line of analysis: the most relevant observation 108 in the context of our paper is that the invariant relativizers deto/ što unambiguously bring about specific readings in both Bg and Cr. 17 See Elbourne (2018) for a general discussion and original examples after which ( 19) and ( 20) have been adapted. 18 The example (19d) is grammatical only if the relative clause contains a resumptive pronoun that co-refers with the head of the relative (the accusative clitic ga in this case).…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Here we will not further pursue this line of analysis: the most relevant observation 108 in the context of our paper is that the invariant relativizers deto/ što unambiguously bring about specific readings in both Bg and Cr. 17 See Elbourne (2018) for a general discussion and original examples after which ( 19) and ( 20) have been adapted. 18 The example (19d) is grammatical only if the relative clause contains a resumptive pronoun that co-refers with the head of the relative (the accusative clitic ga in this case).…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recent detailed work on the semantics of definite descriptions has tended to reject the Russellian theory and advocate presuppositional theories (Hawthorne and Manley 2012;Elbourne 2013Elbourne , 2016Elbourne , 2018Schoubye 2013;Coppock and Beaver 2015). By the Russellian theory I mean the Russellian theory of definite descriptions as traditionally construed (Russell 1905), whereby a sentence of the form (1a) has the truth conditions in (1b) and these truth conditions are assumed to characterize the assertoric B Paul Elbourne paul.elbourne@magd.ox.ac.uk 1 Magdalen College, Oxford OX1 4AU, UK content of an utterance of that sentence; the definite description does not encode any presupposition.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The F is G. b. Assertoric content: a is G (where 'a' is a referential tag picking out the unique F, if such exists). c. Presupposition: There is exactly one F. Elbourne (2013Elbourne ( , 2016Elbourne ( , 2018 and Schoubye (2013). 4,5 In order to handle intensional and other complications, Elbourne (2013Elbourne ( , 2016 embeds the basic analysis in (2) in a situation semantics and Schoubye (2013) embeds it in a modal dynamic semantics; but these details will generally be passed over in the current article.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%