Definition and Division in Plato'sSophist

Abstract

This chapter investigates the so-called method of division, purportedly used in the dialogue Sophist to give the essence of the sophist, i.e., of the sophistic art or expertise. The dialogue's enigma is that it offers not one but seven different definitions, all of them satirical or whimsical, and each purporting to be the account of what sophistry is. The chapter rejects readings on which each of these ‘definitions’, or just the final one — the sophist as a producer of images — is meant seriously as an account of what sophistry is. It argues that the initial assumption — that there is a definable expertise (technē) of sophistry — is one Plato can hardly have shared, given his criteria for what counts as a technē. The chapter concludes that in the Sophist Plato shows both how close sophistry and true philosophy are, and also how they differ — all this without intending the reader to assume that the method of division has revealed any essence of sophistry, since there can be no such thing.

Addressing Circular Definitions via Systems of Proofs

“…intuitions), or simply as general concepts, in other words, everything at all which can be an object of our perception". On the one hand, Bolzano assigns in 3 Plato's "method of division", based upon going through sequences of opposite features, for instance, is presented as marking the difference between the early dialogues of his, where Socrates attempt in solving quests end in aporia, and late dialogues where the solution of the problem originating the discussion is more frequent (see, for instance, [3] and [11]). Aristotle's dialecthic is similarly seen as an attempt to examine the problem of predication (which is one of the critical issues of definitions, philosophically speaking) via questions about opposites (see [8]).…”

“…It seems that answers one can find by looking at primary sources from the same period of time in which this view was proposed are inconclusive, and not because these issues were uninsteresting. On the contrary, scholars observe quite an activity in the attempt of sistematizing the search for good definitions 3 . Yet, there seems to be lack of a clear conclusion in the end of it.…”

What the forms are not: Plato on conceptualism in Parmenides 132b–c

“…Some, such as Cornford (1935) and Notomi (1999) believe that only one definition is given. And others, such as Ryle (1966), Cherniss (1944), andBrown (2010), don't believe that any correct definition of sophistry is produced. While Ryle and Cherniss locate the failure within the method itself, Brown argues that the failure of the method to produce a definition of sophistry lies primarily in the fact that the chosen definiendum is not an appropriate candidate for definition, since sophistry is not a genuine kind; based on what we find in other dialogues, it is not an entity that Plato would recognize as possessing a discernible essence.…”

The Eleatic Stranger's Method in Aristotle's Ethics

“…27See Brown (2010) 154–5 for a useful discussion concerning the role of the Platonic method of division. She argues that in Plato's Sophist and Statesman the stranger uses the method of division for defining a sophist and a statesman rather than for developing taxonomy.…”