Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability

Abstract

When do elections induce politicians to act as delegates, and when do they induce them to act as trustees? To answer this question, we develop a model of political accountability in which politicians vary in both their policy preferences and their competence. We show that elections are more likely to induce politicians to behave as trustees when uncertainty about incumbent policy preferences is low. Otherwise, voters are often unable to credibly commit to vote retrospectively, and incumbents are electorally rewarded for the positions they take as opposed to the outcomes that they generate. Our theoretical results help us understand a number of empirical puzzles, such as why voters sometimes re-elect politicians who are known not to share their preferences. The model also yields predictions about several other factors that determine whether elected officials will act as delegates or trustees.

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