Delegation and Accountability

The effects of bureaucracy on political accountability and electoral selection

“…While his model ignores electoral selection, I examine it by introducing politicians' types. Fox and Jordan (2011); Vlaicu and Whalley (2016) study the effect of delegation to bureaucrats on political accountability. Fox and Jordan (2011) show that delegation to bureaucrats harms political accountability since politicians can implement their preferred policy by using bureaucrats' expertise.…”

“…Fox and Jordan (2011); Vlaicu and Whalley (2016) study the effect of delegation to bureaucrats on political accountability. Fox and Jordan (2011) show that delegation to bureaucrats harms political accountability since politicians can implement their preferred policy by using bureaucrats' expertise. Vlaicu and Whalley (2016) show, instead, that delegation can avoid an inefficient pandering equilibrium because voters obtain additional information from politicians' choice regarding reappointment of bureaucrats.…”

Does Delegation Undermine Accountability? Experimental Evidence on the Relationship Between Blame Shifting and Control

“…One prominent line of thought, the clarity thesis, argues that voters tend to resolve such uncertainty in favor of legislatures (Fox & Jordan ; Majone ; Fiorina ; Nzelibe & Stephenson ; Gersen ; Mesquita & Landa ). When voters know that an agency was involved in the policy‐making process, but do not know the extent of its role, the clarity thesis predicts that they will underassign blame to legislatures and overassign blame to agencies.…”

Deliberate Indiscretion? How Political Corruption Encourages Discretionary Policy Making

“…Theory has long suggested that bureaucratic delegation might allow politicians to avoid responsibility for policy voters dislike (Aranson, Gellhorn, & Robinson, 1982;Fiorina, 1982Fiorina, , 1985Fox & Jordan, 2011;Hood, 2011Hood, , 2002Riker, 1985). The story goes that giving bureaucrats more discretion in making and implementing policy makes it more challenging for voters to lay blame for unfavorable outcomes or to infer politicians' true preferences or competence.…”

“…Under normal circumstances, politicians might discipline bureaucrats after the fact for implementing unfavorable policies, but disciplining ostensibly effective bureaucrats for failing to facilitate something unfavorable, like corruption, is a problematic public action. Thus, theoretical models indicate that only when politicians and bureaucrats have similar preferences can politicians safely delegate and avoid blame and punishment from voters (Fox & Jordan, 2011).…”