Delegation of Power in Normative Multiagent Systems

Boella, Guido; Torre, Leendert van der

doi:10.1007/11786849_6

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…We should also point to other formalisms for reasoning about delegation [9,11,1]. However, in these other works, the focus is rather different to out own.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Delegating Decisions in Strategic Settings

Dunne

Harrenstein

Kraus

et al. 2020

IEEE Trans. Artif. Intell.

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We formalise and investigate the following problem. A principal must delegate a number of decisions to a collection of agents. Once the decisions are delegated, the agents to whom the decisions are delegated will act selfishly, rationally, and independently in pursuit of their own preferences. The principal himself is assumed to be self-interested, and has some goal that he desires to be achieved. The delegation problem is then, given such a setting, is it possible for the principal to delegate decisions in such a way that, if all the agents to whom decisions have been delegated then make decisions rationally, the principal's goal will be achieved in equilibrium. We formalise this problem using Boolean games, which provides a very natural framework within which to capture the delegation problem: decisions are directly represented as Boolean variables, which the principal assigns to agents. After motivating and formally defining the delegation problem, we investigate the computational complexity of the problem, and some issues surrounding it.

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“…We should also point to other formalisms for reasoning about delegation [9,11,1]. However, in these other works, the focus is rather different to out own.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Delegating Decisions in Strategic Settings

Dunne

Harrenstein

Kraus

et al. 2020

IEEE Trans. Artif. Intell.

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“…The addition of the term "Boche" to a language which did not previously contain it would produce a non-conservative extension, i.e., one in which certain statements which did not contain the term were inferable from other statements not containing it which were not previously inferable [6, p. 454]. 5 Dummett's example illustrates how the use of a word in many cases can be determined by two rules Intro and Elim: One rule linking a concept a to an intermediary m and one rule linking intermediary m to a concept b, see Section 1.2.3. (Cf.…”

Section: Grounds and Consequences In Dummett's Theory Of Languagementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The theory is further developed in the work of Grossi, Meyer and Dignum, as well as in the work of Boella and van der Torre. (See [8,9], with references, and [5], with references.) As will appear, although there seem be interrelationships, the background, framework and scope of our theory of intermediaries is different from the theory of "Counts-as".…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Intermediaries and intervenients in normative systems

Lindahl

Odelstad

2008

Journal of Applied Logic

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Many concepts in legal texts are "intermediaries", in the sense that they serve as links between statements of legal grounds, on one hand, and of legal consequences, on the other. In our paper, an algebraic representation of normative systems is used for distinguishing between different kinds of intermediaries and making the idea of a joining between grounds and consequences more precise.In Section 1, the idea of intermediaries is presented and earlier discussions of the subjects are outlined. In Section 2, we introduce the algebraic framework and develop the formal theory. After introducing our approach to the representation of a normative system, we here present a theory of "intervenients", seen as a tool for analysing intermediaries. In Section 3, dealing with applications, after presenting a model of the formal theory, suited for the analysis of concepts in normative systems, we apply the theory to a number of examples, introduced in the first part. Finally, in Section 4, we make some remarks on the methodology of intermediate concepts.

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“…In the context of multi-agent systems (MAS), delegation is important in relation to the coordination of agents and for the coordinating of activities within organizational structures [5]. Trust is, in turn, a fundamental notion in delegation and revocation; ordinarily, a principal i may delegate an access privilege a on an object o to a principal j iff i trusts j sufficiently not to abuse the trust i has in j to perform the action a in relation to o.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamics in Delegation and Revocation Schemes: A Logical Approach

Barker

Boella

Genovese

et al. 2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. In this paper we first introduce a logic for describing formally a family of delegation and revocation models that are based on the work in Hagström et al.. We then extend our logic to accommodate an epistemic interpretation of trust within the framework that we define. What emerges from this work is a rich framework of formally well-defined delegation and revocation schemes that accommodates an important trust component.

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Delegation of Power in Normative Multiagent Systems

Cited by 7 publications

References 25 publications

Delegating Decisions in Strategic Settings

Delegating Decisions in Strategic Settings

Intermediaries and intervenients in normative systems

Dynamics in Delegation and Revocation Schemes: A Logical Approach

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