Deliberation favours social efficiency by making people disregard their relative shares: evidence from USA and India

Capraro, Valerio; Corgnet, Brice; Espín, Antonio M.; Hérnan-Gonzalez, Roberto

doi:10.1098/rsos.160605

Cited by 49 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 96 publications

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“…Labeling the equal outcome as fair in the binary dictator game also aligns our FII predictions with recent findings inCapraro et al (2017) who show that equal outcomes are preferred by intuitive decision makers whereas deliberation allows for a variety of motives to affect decisions.…”

supporting

confidence: 88%

Is fairness intuitive? An experiment accounting for subjective utility differences under time pressure

Merkel¹,

Lohse

2018

Exp Econ

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Evidence from response time studies and time pressure experiments has led several authors to conclude that "fairness is intuitive". In light of conflicting findings we provide theoretical arguments showing under which conditions an increase in "fairness" due to time pressure indeed provides unambiguous evidence in favor of the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis. Drawing on recent applications of the Drift Diffusion Model (Krajbich et al., 2015a), we demonstrate how the subjective difficulty of making a choice affects decisions under time pressure and time delay, thereby making an unambiguous interpretation of time pressure effects contingent on the choice situation. To explore our theoretical considerations and to retest the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis, we analyze choices in two-person binary dictator and prisoner's dilemma games under time pressure or time delay. In addition, we manipulate the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair relative to the selfish option. Our main finding is that time pressure does not consistently promote fairness in situations where this would be predicted after accounting for choice difficulty. Hence, our results cast doubt on the hypothesis that "fairness is intuitive".

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supporting

confidence: 88%

Is fairness intuitive? An experiment accounting for subjective utility differences under time pressure

Merkel¹,

Lohse

2018

Exp Econ

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“…However, very little is known about it. In spite of the importance of this type of decision, I am aware of only one study exploring the cognitive basis of the equity-efficiency trade-off (Capraro, Corgnet, Espín & Hernán-González, 2017). This study found that time pressure promotes equity, while time delay favours efficiency.…”

Section: Extending the Dual-process Approach To Other Types Of Decisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The dual-process approach to human sociality: Meta-analytic evidence for a theory of internalized heuristics for self-preservation

Capraro¹

2019

Preprint

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Which social decisions are intuitive? Which are deliberative? The dual-process approach to human sociality has emerged in the last decades as a vibrant and exciting area of research. Here, I review the existing literature on the cognitive basis of cooperation, altruism, honesty, positive and negative reciprocity, and (act) utilitarianism. I conclude by introducing a game-theoretical framework that organizes the majority of the empirical regularities. This framework extends Rand and colleagues’ Social Heuristics Hypothesis to any one-shot game G. The core assumption of this “General Social Heuristics Hypothesis” is that, under intuition, people play a Nash equilibrium of the “real analogue of G”, G^real, while under deliberation people play a Nash equilibrium of G. G^real differs from G along two dimensions: G is one-shot, while G^real might be iterated; the payoffs of G^real might be different from the payoffs of G, although they are ordered in (almost) the same way.

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“…The effect of culture on strategic interaction has been widely explored [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]. However, the effect of culture on focal point selection in tacit coordination games has not yet been examined.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collectivism-individualism: Strategic behavior in tacit coordination games

2020

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The effect of culture on strategic interaction has been widely explored. However, the effect of the cultural background on focal point selection in tacit coordination games has not yet been examined. To accomplish this goal, in this study we have focused on the individual level of analysis. That is, we constructed a strategic profile to model the behavior of each individual player and then used unsupervised learning methods on the individual data points. We have chosen to examine two groups of participants, Israelis (ICB) and Chinese (CCB), each belonging to a different cultural background representing individualist and collectivist societies, respectively. Clustering the individual strategic profiles has allowed us to gain further insights regarding the differences between the behavioral strategies of each cultural group. The results of this study demonstrate that the cultural background has a profound effect on the strategic profile and on the ability to succeed in tacit coordination games. Moreover, the current study emphasizes the importance of relying on the individual level of analysis and not only on the group level of analysis. The implications of these results and potential future studies are discussed.

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Deliberation favours social efficiency by making people disregard their relative shares: evidence from USA and India

Cited by 49 publications

References 96 publications

Is fairness intuitive? An experiment accounting for subjective utility differences under time pressure

Is fairness intuitive? An experiment accounting for subjective utility differences under time pressure

The dual-process approach to human sociality: Meta-analytic evidence for a theory of internalized heuristics for self-preservation

Collectivism-individualism: Strategic behavior in tacit coordination games

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