Delusions and Brain Injury: The Philosophy and Psychology of Belief

Abstract

Circumscribed delusional beliefs can follow brain injury. We suggest that these involve anomalous perceptual experiences created by a deficit to the person's perceptual system, and misinterpretation of these experiences due to biased reasoning. We use the Capgras delusion (the claim that one or more of one's close relatives has been replaced by an exact replica or impostor) to illustrate this argument. Our account maintains that people voicing this delusion suffer an impairment that leads to faces being perceived as drained of their normal affective significance, and an additional reasoning bias that leads them to put greater weight on forming beliefs that are observationally adequate rather than beliefs that are a conservative extension of their existing stock. We show how this position can integrate issues involved in the philosophy and psychology of belief, and examine the scope for mutually beneficial interaction.

Failing to self-ascribe thought and motion: Towards a three-factor account of passivity symptoms in schizophrenia

“…Maher, 1974Maher, , 1988Maher, , 1992Maher, , 1999 and those who think that delusional beliefs are irrational responses to abnormal experience (e.g. Stone and Young, 1997;Davies and Coltheart, 2000;Coltheart et al, 2007;Coltheart, 2013). While both camps are capable of giving two-factor accounts, the first camp will explain the second factor in terms of normal reasoning and continuing abnormal experience 1 whereas the second camp will explain the second factor in terms of abnormal reasoning alone.…”

Filosofía de la mente y Psiquiatría alcances y límites de una perspectiva naturalista para el estudio de los delirios

“…Esto pondría en jaque la posibilidad de explicar en térmi-nos intencionales los delirios. Al respecto, algunos autores (Blackwood, Howard, Bentall & Murray, 2001;Coltheart, 2007;Stone & Young, 1998) han señalado, en línea con la psiquiatría biológica, que al igual que el resto de los trastornos psiquiátricos, los delirios deben ser explicados en términos de un mal funcionamiento cerebral. Antes de continuar, cabe repasar cómo son usualmente conceptualizados los delirios.…”

Can dispositionalism about belief vindicate doxasticism about delusion?

“…These causes are reflected in Bayne's and Pacherie's example of choice, which is that of deluded patients who know that acting on their beliefs might result in hospitalization (Stone and Young 1997). As a consequence, they keep from acting in the way the dispositional profiles for the relevant delusional beliefs would lead us to expect.…”