Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences

Hohwy, Jakob; Rajan, Vivek

doi:10.1007/s12152-011-9124-6

Cited by 26 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Some say they belong to some other familiar folk-psychological categories, such as imagination [Currie 2000;Currie and Jureidini 2001;Currie and Ravenscroft 2002], pretense [Gendler 2007], or illusion [Hohwy and Rajan 2012]. Others argue that no familiar folk-psychological category fits the bill, which motivates them to invent new categories, such as "bimagination" [Egan 2009], a hybrid of belief and imagination that incorporates stereotypical elements of both.…”

Section: A Question Of Attitude: Are Delusions Beliefs?mentioning

confidence: 99%

When Words Speak Louder than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion

Rosé¹,

Buckwalter²,

Turri³

2014

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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People suffering from severe monothematic delusions, such as Capgras, Fregoli or Cotard patients, regularly assert extraordinary and unlikely things. For example, some say that their loved ones have been replaced by impostors. A popular view in philosophy and cognitive science is that such monothematic delusions aren't beliefs because they don't guide behavior and affect in the way that beliefs do. Or, if they are beliefs, they are somehow anomalous, atypical, or marginal beliefs. We present evidence from five studies that folk psychology unambiguously views monothematic delusions as stereotypical beliefs. This calls into question widespread assumptions in the professional literature about belief's stereotypical functional profile. We also show that folk psychology views delusional patients as holding contradictory beliefs. And we also show that frequent assertion is a powerful cue to belief-ascription, more powerful than even a robust and consistent track record of non-verbal behavior.Keywords: delusion, belief, folk psychology, assertion * This is a penultimate version of a paper (4/5/14) forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.Please cite the final, published version if possible. 2 A Question of Attitude: Are Delusions Beliefs?In their work on clinical subjects, Hirstein and Ramachandran [1997] present the case of a patient named DS. DS was a middle-aged man who suffered a traumatic brain injury in a gruesome traffic accident. In the year following his injury he began what appeared to be a remarkable and speedy recovery. DS regained his powers of speech, intelligence, as well as nearly all his cognitive and social skills. However there was something very strange about DS after his accident. He would regularly tell his doctors, family, and friends that his parents had been replaced by imposters.DS was later diagnosed with a condition called Capgras Syndrome, a rare neurological disorder where patients suffer the delusion that someone close to them -such as a loved one, family member, or friend -has been replaced by a duplicate or imposter. Typical of Capgras patients, when others confront DS with putative evidence that his parents are not actually imposters, his assertions to the contrary persist. Note well that even those who defend the view that delusions are (at least partly) beliefs agree that these attitudes "deviate" from "the causal-functional patterns in behavior and cognition characteristic of belief," in which case "the assumptions inherent in the practice of belief ascription start to break down." We're then left with a choice: "either abandon belief talk or allow for some indeterminacy in it" [Schwitzgebel 2011: 16].We question the widespread assumption that delusional attitudes, such as DS's, are not Before presenting our studies, we want to dispel any appearance that our thesis is somehow radical or revisionary and, thus, that we bear an especially demanding burden of proof.We think that belief is the natural first candidate for categorizing delusions. In fact, clinical psychologis...

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Section: A Question Of Attitude: Are Delusions Beliefs?mentioning

confidence: 99%

When Words Speak Louder than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion

Rosé¹,

Buckwalter²,

Turri³

2014

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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“…I have suggested that we understand this prediction error within the framework provided by predictive error minimization. Modeling my account on Jakob Hohwy's (, ; Hohwy and Rajan, ) one‐factor account of delusions, I suggested that we understand the spike in phasic dopamine as a prediction error. There is evidence that dopaminergic response results from the violation of expectations, regardless of whether there is any reward attached to the expectation (Corlett et al , ).…”

Section: Judgment‐shiftmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘My Name is Joe and I'm an Alcoholic’: Addiction, Self‐knowledge and the Dangers of Rationalism

Levy

2016

Mind & Language

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Rationalist accounts of self-knowledge are motivated in important part by the claim that only by looking to our reasons to discover our beliefs and desires are we active in relation to them and only thereby do we take responsibility for them. These kinds of account seem to predict that self-knowledge generated using third-personal methods or analogues of these methods will tend to undermine the capacity to exercise self-control. In this light, the insistence by treatment programs that addicts acknowledge that they are addicts seems puzzling. I argue that because addicts-and perhaps ordinary akratics, to some extent at least, too-are vulnerable to losing control of their actions via losing control over their beliefs, advising them to look to their reasons for actions is counterproductive and facilitates loss of control. In contrast, an insistence on what I call impersonal self-knowledge, knowledge of some of one's states and dispositions generated by third-personal means, may help to reestablish control.

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“…imaginative states that are misidentified by the subjects as beliefs (Currie, 2000;Currie and Jureidini, 2001). Hohwy and colleagues argue that delusions should be understood as the result of perceptual inferences (Hohwy and Rosenberg, 2005;Hohwy and Rajan, 2012). Egan (2009) There are a number of ways in which the doxastic advocate might reply to this attack.…”

Section: The Argument About Subjective Certaintymentioning

confidence: 99%

The typology problem and the doxastic approach to delusions

López-Silva

2016

Filosofia Unisinos

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This paper explores one of the most fundamental philosophical worries underlying the occurrence of delusions, namely, the problem about the specific type of mental state that grounds a delusional report or, as I shall call it, 'the typology problem'. The analysis is developed as follows: (i) After formulating and circumscribing the target problem, (ii) I explore the main tenets and advantages of the doxastic view of delusions, perhaps, the strongest candidate currently available within the typology debate. (iii) After, I clarify and evaluate four of the main counter-arguments against the doxastic view offering a number of counter replies to these attacks. (iv) Finally, I conclude that the anti-doxastic argumentation offers no good reasons to abandon the doxastic model and that this model does not need to appeal to external resources to reply to such counter-arguments. At the same time, I finalize with some of the challenges that remain open within the doxastic view.Keywords: psychosis, delusions, doxastic view of delusions, typology problem. RESUMOEsse artigo explora uma das preocupações filosóficas mais fundamentais que subjazem à manifestação de delírios, a saber, o problema do tipo específico de estado mental que fundamenta um relato de delírio -o que chamarei de 'problema tipológico'. A análise empreendida é desenvolvida do seguinte modo: (i) Após formular e circunscrever o problema-alvo, (ii) exploro os principais comprometimentos e vantagens da explicação doxástica dos delírios, que é talvez a mais forte dentre as soluções propostas dentro do debate tipológico. (iii) A seguir, esclareço e avalio quatro dos principais argumentos contra a explicação doxástica, oferecendo réplicas a esses ataques. (iv) Finalmente, concluo que a argumentação anti-doxástica não oferece boas razões para abandonarmos o modelo doxástico e argumento que esse modelo não precisa apelar a recursos externos para responder aos argumentos anti-doxásticos. Termino o artigo expondo alguns desafios ao modelo doxásti-co que permanecem em aberto.Palavras-chave: psicose, delírios, visão doxástica de delírios, problema tipológico.

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Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences

Cited by 26 publications

References 23 publications

When Words Speak Louder than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion

When Words Speak Louder than Actions: Delusion, Belief, and the Power of Assertion

‘My Name is Joe and I'm an Alcoholic’: Addiction, Self‐knowledge and the Dangers of Rationalism

The typology problem and the doxastic approach to delusions

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