Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer

Chen, Kebing; Xiao, Tiaojun

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2008.06.006

Cited by 197 publications

(89 citation statements)

References 26 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Xiao and Qi investigated how to coordinate a supply chain with multiple competing retailers using game theory when the production cost was disrupted [14]. Chen and Xiao designed linear quantity discount and wholesale price contracts in a supply chain with production cost and demand disruptions [15]. Zhang et al investigated how to coordinate the supply chain with demand disruptions by revenue-sharing contracts [16].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision Analysis for Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Manufacturing Cost Disruptions

Han

Wang

2013

Proceedings of 2013 4th International Asia Conference on Industrial Engineering and Management Innovation (IEMI2013)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper studies the decisions in closed-loop supply chain with manufacturing cost disruptions. We find that the optimal solutions in stable context are still robust when manufacturing cost disruptions are small. The optimal decisions are revised when manufacturing cost disruptions exceed the thresholds. Moreover, the decision maker in centralized context and manufacturer in decentralized context always prefer to change their decisions with disruptions, while the retailer in decentralized context only prefer to change when the manufacturing cost disruption is negative.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision Analysis for Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Manufacturing Cost Disruptions

Han

Wang

2013

Proceedings of 2013 4th International Asia Conference on Industrial Engineering and Management Innovation (IEMI2013)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Xiao et al (2007) investigated how a SC with two competing retailers was coordinated by a quantity discount mechanism after demand was disrupted. Chen and Xiao (2009) developed linear quantity discount and Groves wholesale price schedules in a SC consisting of one manufacturer and one dominant retailer after the production cost and demand were disrupted. Huang et al (2013a, b) studied production decisions in a dual-channel SC with demand and production costs disruptions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Production and coordination decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing cost disruptions when retailers compete

Han

Yang

et al. 2015

J Intell Manuf

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper studies the production and coordination decisions in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with one manufacturer and two competing retailers when remanufacturing costs are disrupted. We find that the pricing and production quantity decisions have certain robust regions when facing disruptions; and the more intense of competition between retailers, the smaller the robustness regions. Moreover, the manufacturer would like to adjust the production decisions when facing large size of positive or negative disruptions, while the retailers only would like to adjust them when facing large size of negative disruptions. Finally, we find that the revenue-sharing contracts can effectively coordinate the CLSCs, whereas more profits are required by retailers under large positive disruptions.

show abstract

“…The concept of "retailer dominance" is studied from two aspects in the game-theoretic supply chain literature. The first aspect, "parallel dominance", considers a powerful retailer dominating over other competing retailers (see, e.g., [4][5]). The second aspect is "vertical dominance", where a retailer dominates a manufacturer in a Stackelberg gaming relationship (e.g.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing and advertising decisions in a dominant-retailer supply chain: A multi-follower bi-level programming approach

Mokhlesian

Zegordi

2017

Scientia Iranica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Pricing and advertising is one of the most important decisions in each supply chain especially in the competitive environment. In the previous studies, this is as a centralized decision. However, if each channel member makes its decision independently, the utility of all members is optimized. In such decentralized situations, the channel members may have different market power that they influence on the other members' decisions. These issues can modeled through leader-follower Stackelberg game or bi-level programming. This study investigates coordination of pricing and cooperative advertising in a two-stage supply chain consisting of one dominant-retailer and multiple competitive manufactures which produce several perishable and substitutable products. This paper aims to determine pricing and cooperative advertising decisions expenditure as well as the amount of manufacturers' production or retailer's purchase such that utility of all members is met. Hence, the problem is modeled as a multifollower bi-level programming problem. Since it is proved that the model is NP-hard, the proposed model is solved

show abstract

Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer

Cited by 197 publications

References 26 publications

Decision Analysis for Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Manufacturing Cost Disruptions

Decision Analysis for Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Manufacturing Cost Disruptions

Production and coordination decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing cost disruptions when retailers compete

Pricing and advertising decisions in a dominant-retailer supply chain: A multi-follower bi-level programming approach

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About