Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy

Abstract

In this book, first published in 2001, Kenneth Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between the government and opposition parties influences the decision to use threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. The relative transparency of their political processes means that, while democratic governments cannot easily conceal domestic constraints against using force, they can also credibly demonstrate resolve when their threats enjoy strong domestic support. As a result, compared to their non-democratic counterparts, democracies are more selective about making threats, but those they do make are more likely to be successful - that is, to gain a favorable outcome without resort to war. Schultz develops his argument through a series of game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies.

Honor and War

“…Concern for reputation for resolve is parameterized as a cost to backing down, which is weakly increasing in the level of escalation. our operationalization of reputation concerns is similar to the typical formalization of domestic audience costs, which makes sense since domestic audience costs are conceptualized as being motivated by concern for international reputation; see, for example, fearon 1994 ;Schultz 2001a;Slantchev 2011;Trager and Vavreck 2011. 38 Cohen et al 1999. frequency of mIds depends on the shape of the probability distribution of costs for fighting.…”

Concepts and Measurement in Multimethod Research

“…To illustrate the hazards of concept misformation and suggest some solutions, the article examines three recent books that deploy MMR designs, Schultz's (2001) Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, Lieberman's (2003) Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa, and Lange's (2009) Lineages of Despotism and Development: British Colonialism and State Power. These works break significant ground methodologically and substantively, and each has garnered considerable scholarly recognition.…”

Democracies Under Fire: How Democratic Targets and Allies Respond to Coercive Threats

“…This combination makes democratic targets and those states that are reliant upon powerful, democratic allies more likely to make concessions when they are threatened. I will begin by outlining my theory as it applies to targets of coercive threats and their allies, contrasting it with the argument raised by Schultz (2001a). I will then address potential confounders, such as the ability for leaders to use conflict to improve their domestic standing and potentially endogenous relationship between democratic leaders and public opinion.…”

“…While Schultz (2001a) focuses on how opposition parties reinforce or undermine signals of resolve, I instead concentrate on how observable actions by the public can reveal instability and constraint to other states that might threaten the democratic target. When a public demonstration occurs in a democracy, it is a relatively simple task to trace how these indicators of displeasure could influence the regime: if the unhappiness of the public is deep and widespread enough, when the next election occurs, the leadership can be voted out of power.…”

“…There are an unlimited number of ways this could be performed. In his study of coercive diplomacy, Schultz (2001a) conceived of threats in the guise of an extensive form game, with three moves: the initiator choosing whether to challenge the status quo or not; if a threat was issued, the target deciding whether to resist or not; and if the target resisted, whether the initiator stood firm or backed down. (27) In contrast, Sechser (forthcoming) frames it in the context of an ultimatum game, where two actors are bargaining over a good, with the coercer making a "take it or leave it"…”