Democracy and the Politics of Electoral System Choice

Abstract

Amel Ahmed brings new historical evidence and a novel theoretical framework to bear on the study of democratization. Looking at the politics of electoral system choice at the time of suffrage expansion among early democratizers, she shows that the electoral systems used in advanced democracies today were initially devised as exclusionary safeguards to protect pre-democratic elites from the impact of democratization and, particularly, the existential threat posed by working-class mobilization. The ubiquitous use and enduring nature of these safeguards calls into question the familiar picture of democracy moving along a path of increasing inclusiveness. Instead, what emerges is a picture that is riddled with ambiguity, where inclusionary democratic reforms combine with exclusionary electoral safeguards to form a permanent part of the new democratic order. This book has important implications for our understanding of the dynamics of democratic development both in early democracies and in emerging democracies today.

Government Selection and Executive Powers: Constitutional Design in Parliamentary Democracies

“…The British investiture too is special. It is a 1991-2003Germany 1949-2013Netherlands 1868-2013Armenia 1995-2013Greece 1877-1909Norway 1884-2013Austria 1920-1934Greece 1927-1935Poland 1989-2013Austria 1945-2013Greece 1946-1967Portugal 1976-2013Belgium 1857-2013Hungary 1990-2013Romania 1991-2013Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995-2013Iceland 1904-2013Serbia 2006-2013Bulgaria 1991-2013Ireland 1922-2013Serbia and Montenegro 2003Croatia 1991-2013Italy 1861-1922Slovakia 1993-2013…”

“…First, we stipulate that no regime that employs a negative majority rule to invest a government can be considered strong, irrespective of how the other two dimensions are configured. This affects four cases: Belgium 1995-2013, Portugal 1976-1981and 1982-2013, and Sweden 1974-2013, which are coded as having weak investiture regimes. Second, we require the presence of only one of the two possible features of a strong investiture regime in unicameral legislatures: either an absolute majority requirement or a proactive role for parliament.…”

“…The reason is that unicameral legislatures already encompass the entire parliament, with no chamber left out of the formation process. Thus, the regimes in Albania (1998-2013), Bulgaria (1991-2013), Estonia (1992-2013), Finland (2000-2013 and Lithuania (1992) are considered strong, because they provide for a proactive role for parliament (even though they require less than an absolute majority for a successful investiture). Similarly, Armenia (1995-2013), Georgia (2004-2013 and Slovakia (1993Slovakia ( -2013 are considered strong regimes because they adopt absolute majority (in spite of a reactive role of parliament).…”

The Adoption of Proportional Representation

“…Several studies assume that Social Democratic parties were supportive of the adoption of proportional representation. As recent studies have pointed out, this assumption may be inaccurate and cannot adequately account for the observed empirical variation in the preferences of Social Democratic parties across Europe on the question of electoral reform (Ahmed 2012;Penadés 2008). We can, however, derive theoretically the preferences of Social Democrats by taking seat-vote disproportionality into account.…”

“…T he study of the process of reform of electoral institutions during the first decades of the twentieth century and the adoption of proportional representation (PR) by some countries has been at the center of comparative research in recent years (Ahmed 2012;Benoit 2004;Blais, Dobrzynska and Indridason 2005;Boix 1999;Calvo 2009;Colomer 2005;Soskice 2007, 2010;Kreuzer 2010). 1 This renewed interest in the origin of these political choices has been partly motivated by a related literature examining the importance of proportional representation in affecting a range of political outcomes, including the level of government expenditures, the types of social-spending programs, levels of inequality, and so on.…”