Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs

Abstract

The question of strengths and weaknesses of national parliaments in EU affairs, one of the most salient in the debate on the democratic legitimacy of the EU, is generally answered by assessing formal parliamentary powers which can influence their governments' EU policy. Such an evaluation, however, is flawed: Formal mandating rights are usually incompatible with the overall logic of parliamentary systems, which explains why most national parliaments make very little use of them. Even more importantly, it unduly reduces parliamentary functions to the legislative or policy-making function. Drawing on agency theory, it will instead be argued that the functions of public deliberation and of holding the government publicly to account are at least as important and therefore need to be included in a redefined concept of parliamentary strength. In particular, the article proposes a distinction between two different elements of accountability-monitoring and political scrutiny-which recognises parliamentary majority and opposition as two distinct agents of the electorate.

From constraining to catalysing dissensus? The impact of political contestation on parliamentary communication in EU affairs

“…While disagreements between coalition partners increase the incentives to 'police the bargain' (Martin and Vanberg, 2004; see also Winzen, 2013, pp. 304-305), governing parties have no incentive to wash their dirty laundry in public, but rather to smooth out dissent internally to uphold 'the public impression of efficiency and competence' (Schüttemeyer, 2009, p. 5; see also Auel, 2007). Thus, stronger disagreement between coalition partners on EU issues is expected to act as a disincentive for parliamentary communication.…”

“…When it comes to parliamentary communication of EU issues, however, it has been argued that a different logic may be at play and that stronger institutional power may indeed lead to less communication of EU issues. Governing parties, in particular those of strong national parliaments, may rather want to monitor the government behind closed doors without public criticism that might damage the reputation of the cabinet (Auel 2007;Auel and Raunio 2014b). For example, the main parties in the strong Nordic parliaments have deliberately 'depoliticised' European integration through cross-party cooperation in the EAC with the aim of manufacturing consensus in national integration policy (Bergman and Damgaard eds., 2000;Raunio, 2014).…”

“…Much of the existing literature has focused on the role of parliaments in scrutinising, monitoring and controlling (their government's) EU policy-making. Recently, however, the parliamentary communication function in EU affairs has gained increased attention: National parliaments are crucial as arenas for the debates over important EU issues and their national implications (Auel, 2007;Auel and Raunio, 2014a and b;de Wilde, 2011;Rauh, 2015;Wendler, 2014a and b). By communicating EU affairs to their citizens, they not only legitimise national politics in EU affairs, but can also add to the legitimacy of EU governance.…”

“…In addition, by holding their governments accountable, that is by inducing them to explain European issues and decisions, to clarify European negotiation situations and to justify their negotiation behaviour, national parliaments contribute to the public accountability of EU policy-making (Auel, 2007). Thus, the 'communicative performance of national parliaments in EU affairs is directly related to the often discussed democratic deficits of supranational governance: if MPs raise European issues, they offer a remedy to the otherwise opaque procedures, the overwhelming complexity, and the difficult attribution of political responsibility in decision-making beyond the nation state' (Rauh, 2015, p. 118).…”

Out of Time? National Parliaments and Early Decision-Making in the European Union

“…Such turn towards greater informalization of the EU decisionmaking process is likely to have considerable implications for national parliaments' ability to scrutinize and influence EU affairs. By adding another level to the delegation chain, national parliaments face increased risk of information asymmetries and possible agency loss (Auel 2007).…”