McBride (in this issue) rightfully stresses some differences between IS and natural sciences (NS). For him, for example, the IS phenomenon is more complex than cancer biology. This is questionable. 1 The complexity, however, may be different. Another difference noted by McBride (this issue) is human intentionality, which NS phenomena lack. AI research issues (e.g. ethics of AI), however, may introduce non-human intentionality in IS. We proposed that we can also learn from NS despite the differences (Siponen and Klaavuniemi, this issue): "Many differences exist between IS and the natural sciences, and thus IS should not blindly follow the natural sciences. However, there is much that IS research could learn and adopt from natural science research." Hevner (this issue) clarifies that the goal of scientific research is truth-not absolute truth. This clarification is important. However, it remains to be seen how idealizations common in sciences are compatible with this view. In addition, many candidates for "laws" in IS, including design science, seems more rightly probabilistic statements rather than genuine laws (Siponen and Klaavuniemi, 2020). According to Mingers (this issue), most of Siponen and Klaavuniemi's (this issue) criticism has been covered by critical realism (CR). Although CR advocates in IS often posit CR against, and superior to, positivism and interpretivism, we missed a systematic critique of NS beliefs in IS by CR advocates. Mingers (this issue) criticizes that we did not put forward "an alternative approach," or a model. We in Siponen and Klaavuniemi (this issue) did not introduce a specific model or approach. However, Siponen and Klaavuniemi (this issue) recommended several issues for future consideration. These recommendations were given without restriction to a specific approach, or a philosopher. This is a strength. It allows IS scholars to update their views based on recent developments in the philosophy of science, without imposing any restrictions by a specific philosopher or approach. Mingers (this issue) highlights the promise of mechanismbased explanations (MBEs), as they are often deemed alternative to laws. MBEs are promising, especially given that we hardly have genuine laws or deductive-nomological (D-N)