Demystifying trust: Experimental evidence from Cambodia and Thailand

Abstract

We report the results of a trust survey and public goods experiment conducted with high school students in rural Thailand and Cambodia that together help clarify the dynamics at work in sustaining economic cooperation within these two third-world communities. We find that standard survey measures of trust employed by the World Values Survey, which form the basis of most macro-empirical investigations of trust and political-economic development, are not useful for predicting contributions to a public goods game. Expectations, on the other hand, profoundly influence contributions and do so independently of trust levels. However, this influence is complex and depends on the distribution of player types. We observe a distribution similar to previous studies, with the largest group, principled reciprocators, updating their behavior quickly based on expectations of trustworthiness. Indeed, this study suggests that trustworthiness in particular is more important than trust in general and further challenges ‘a-rational’ theories of trust.

Social networks, ethnic diversity, and cooperative behavior in rural Malawi

“…Such measures require greater resources and the benefits in particular for including survey measures of trust are unclear (Anderson et al, 2004;English, 2011;Glaeser et al, 2000). The study also used only one measure of social networks: self reports of whether Subject A considered Subject B a close friend.…”

“…Each move allows us to see two elements of trust: Subject A's decision on whether to trust Subject B and Subject B's decision on whether to respond as trustworthy. Scholars have used this trust game (or variants of it) to identify determinants of trust and trusting behavior, be it gender (Croson and Buchan, 1999), a subject's reported risk profile (Eckel and Wilson, 2004), expectations about how trusting or trustworthy others are (English, 2011), the attractiveness of strangers (Wilson and Eckel, 2006), and, particularly germane to the present study, social connection and racial differences (Glaeser et al, 2000).…”

“…Other measures such as play in a public goods game, actual contributions to public goods, or survey measures of trust (including expectations of how others will play) could provide additional insight on how communities overcome collective action problems. Such measures require greater resources and the benefits in particular for including survey measures of trust are unclear (Anderson et al, 2004;English, 2011;Glaeser et al, 2000).…”

Political trust in experimental designs

“…2. Such experiments are not confined to the laboratory (see, for example, English, 2012). Buchan et al (2009) use the public goods game to assess whether exposure to globalization leads to greater trust.…”