Denial-of-Sleep Attacks against IoT Networks

Abstract

Numerous medium access control (MAC) have been proposed for Low-power Lossy Networks (LLNs) over the recent years. They aim at ensuring both energy efficiency and robustness of the communication transmissions. Nowadays, we observe deployments of LLNs for potentially critical application scenarios (e.g., plant monitoring, building automation), which require both determinism and security guarantees. They involve battery-powered devices which communicate over lossy wireless links. Radio interfaces are turned off by a node as soon as no traffic is to be sent or relayed. Denial-of-sleep attacks consist in exhausting the devices by forcing them to keep their radio on. We here focus on jamming attacks whose impact can be mitigated by approaches such as time-division and channel hopping techniques. We use the IEEE 802.15.4e standard to show that such approaches manage to be resistant to basic jamming but yet remain vulnerable to selective jamming. We discuss the potential impacts of such onslaughts, depending on the knowledge gained by the attacker, and to what extent envisioned protections may allow jamming attacks to be handled at upper layers.

Securing Wireless Sensor Networks Against Denial‐of‐Sleep Attacks Using RSA Cryptography Algorithm and Interlock Protocol

“…And D, Attack interval, respectively. As shown in the figure, ASDA-RSA increases the residual energy by more than 11,14,15,16,20, and 23% those of current approaches, respectively. Figure 12 and 13, shows the comparison of the ASDA-RSA proposed scheme, CrossLayer, ASDA-BlowFish, ASDA-AES, GA-DoSLD, ASDA-3DES, and ASDA-DES models in term of Lifetime.…”

“…The vulnerabilities existing in MAC solutions as well as embeddable mechanisms to provide inherent security are the main focus of this paper. 20 Specifically, we investigate scenarios of physical jamming in which, attackers prevent communication establishment and thus, result in repetitive retransmissions as well as additional duty for the target devices. Prior to focusing on technologies in communication that are investigated by a number of main standardization bodies, numerous existing attacks are investigated in detail.…”

“…The ratio of malicious sensor node to total normal node that were mistakenly detected as a normal node. Therefore, theFPR,FNR,TPR, and TNRis defined as illustrated in Equation (17), Equation (18), Equation (19) and Equation (20).…”

Attack Categorisation for IoT Applications in Critical Infrastructures, a Survey

“…Low-Level Issues encompasses all threats against the lowest network layers, Physical and Data-Link, but also against the hardware itself. This includes such attacks as jamming, sleep deprivation, otherwise know as Denial-of-Sleep [103], which forces devices to stay awake and transmit data, causing their energy reserves to dwindle, resulting in a DoS attack [104], or a low level spoofing attack, like faking a MAC address to trick neighbours.…”

Security Analysis of Out‐of‐Band Device Pairing Protocols: A Survey

“…The constraint nature of the target IoT devices is not be taken into account in the threat model since we only consider the attacks that are aiming to compromise the pairing procedure. Thus, the denial of sleep [74] or the denial of service attacks [75] are not in the score of this work. We conclude the existence of two categories of threat models:…”