Denying Descartes and wary of Wittgenstein: Response to Franz

Abstract

In his article, “‘Are Psychological Attributes Quantitative?’ is not an Empirical Question: Conceptual Confusions in the Measurement Debate,” Franz (2021) concludes that psychological measurement does not rest on empirical hypotheses but rather on linguistic deceptions. His major premise is that psychometrics is inherently Cartesian. History shows otherwise: the mantras of operationism and the rituals of construct validity were intended to exorcise psyche from psychometrics. These mainstays of psychometrics ensured that theoretical constructs were more frequently dispositional concepts than they were mental concepts. It is with the latter, however, especially with attempts to measure currently occurring mental states, such as anxiety, that Franz’s argument looks more promising, but nevertheless it fails because it rests upon Wittgenstein’s views about the grammar of mental discourse. I conclude that conceptual analysis, realistically construed and applied to mental concepts, may show that they exclude quantitative structure. Despite that, it is always possible that empirical research might elicit quantitative-friendly revisions of mental concepts.

Nondecomposable Item Response Theory Models: Fundamental Measurement in Psychometrics

“…Finally, it is worth noting that measurement theory, despite its relevance for evaluating the validity of IRMs, has had little impact on psychometric practices. This point was reinforced many times by Michell (2008aMichell ( , 2008bMichell ( , 2021aMichell ( , 2021b and others (e.g., Cliff, 1992;Heene, 2013;Sijtsma, 2012). In this scenario, the present study offers an alternative for those willing to combine measurement theory and psychometrics: the implementation of psychometric models based on less known measurement theories.…”

Nondecomposable Item Response Theory models: Fundamental measurement in psychometrics

“…Finally, it is worth to reinforce that measurement theory, despite its relevance for evaluating the validity of IRT models, has had little impact on psychometric practices. This point was discussed extensively by Michell (2008aMichell ( , 2008bMichell ( , 2021aMichell ( , 2021b and others (e.g., Cliff, 1992;Heene, 2013;Sijtsma, 2012). In this scenario, the present study offers an alternative for those willing to combine measurement theory and psychometrics: the implementation of psychometric models based on less known measurement theories.…”

Science or not, conceptual problems remain: Seeking conceptual clarity around “psychology as a science” debates

“…Another common argument is that our “folk” (everyday) concepts are insufficient for capturing the true nature of psychological phenomena and that, with time, researchers will refine current concepts to be more amenable to measurement practices. For example, Michell (2022) posited that “it is possible that our current conceptualisation misfits the phenomena of anxiety in all its richness, in which case our empirical investigations might alter our concept, including its logical relation to quantitative structure” (pp. 153–154).…”

“…While it is true that the rules of grammar can and often do change over time, the notion that our current conception of anxiety is a "misfit" presumes that the meaning of anxiety exists independent of language use. However, the very fact that Michell (2022) and other psychologists can discuss the notion of "anxiety" and potentially create items for an anxiety scale presupposes that anxiety has a meaning (and that researchers are already aware of what it is). One must already know how to sensibly use the term anxiety to create an anxiety scale.…”