Department-Level Representations: A New Approach to the Study of Science Teacher Cognition

Abstract

Research on science teacher cognition is important as findings from this research can be used to improve teacher training, leading to improved classroom practice. Previous research has often relied on two underlying assumptions: Cognition is an individual process, and these processes are detailed and introspective. In this paper, we put forth a complimentary model of cognition, drawing from theoretical assumptions suggesting (1) there exist social influences on the cognition of individuals and (2) cognitive processes are often less introspective than previously assumed. We then detail a method of data collection that we used to gather evidence in support of our complimentary model of teacher cognition. Results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of this model, suggesting the cognition of science teachers may be shaped by social and implicit influences. We then provide implications of our data collection method and theoretical framework. Finally, we provide directions for future research.

Applying a goal‐driven model of science teacher cognition to the resolution of two anomalies in research on the relationship between science teacher education and classroom practice

“…Drawing on a substantial body of literature from both educational and psychological research, our theoretical model takes as first principles that cognition is a set of processes acting over mental representations to produce thoughts, actions, and learning (In education, see Chi, ; Frederiksen, ; Hutner & Markman, ; Novak, ; Opfer, Nehm, & Ha, ; Reynolds, Sinatra, & Jetton, . In psychology, see Anderson, , , ; Bransford & Johnson, ; Carver & Scheier, ; Hutchins, ; Marcus, ; Markman, ; Newell, ; Palmer, ; Pylyshyn, ).…”

“…Our second foundational assumption is that not all representations stored in long‐term memory are used during each cognitive process. Instead, only those representations that are active take part in a given cognitive process (Anderson, , ; Carver & Scheier, ; Eitam & Higgins, ; Hutner & Markman, ; Kahneman, ). That is, cognitive processes cannot use the information contained in a representation that is not active.…”

“…As we have discussed elsewhere, there are two broad causal mechanisms that lead to the activation of a representation (Hutner & Markman, ,). First, some representations are susceptible to being activated across contexts.…”

“…First, some representations are susceptible to being activated across contexts. This chronic accessibility is a function of both the frequency of activation in past cognitive processes and the importance of the representation to the person (Higgins, ; Hutner & Markman, ,). Second, a representation can become active because it is appropriate to the current situation (Higgins, ; Hutner & Markman, ,; Kahneman, ).…”

“…This chronic accessibility is a function of both the frequency of activation in past cognitive processes and the importance of the representation to the person (Higgins, ; Hutner & Markman, ,). Second, a representation can become active because it is appropriate to the current situation (Higgins, ; Hutner & Markman, ,; Kahneman, ). Thus, the activation of a particular representation tends to activate other related representations (Higgins, ; Hutner & Markman, ,; Kahneman, ).…”