Dependence and a Kantian conception of dignity as a value

Byers, Philippa

doi:10.1007/s11017-016-9351-2

Cited by 10 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…4 Treating a person as an end requires treating that person as having a dignity or worth that is beyond the worth of what a particular person does or is. Phillipa Byers argues that dignity is independent of one’s own goals and purposes, yet it gives value to these purposes (Byers 2016 , p. 63). She argues that dignity is the ground of any other kind of value (ibid., p. 63) and is the sole reason for duty or moral activity towards others.…”

Section: On Dignitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The particularity of dignity: relational engagement in care at the end of life

Pols

Pasveer

Willems

2017

Med Health Care and Philos

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This paper articulates dignity as relational engagement in concrete care situations. Dignity is often understood as an abstract principle that represents inherent worth of all human beings. In actual care practices, this principle has to be substantiated in order to gain meaning and inform care activities. We describe three exemplary substantiations of the principle of dignity in care: as a state or characteristic of a situation; as a way to differentiate between socio-cultural positions; or as personal meaning. We continue our analysis by presenting cases on dignity in care related to us in focus groups with medical professionals. Our empirical ethical lens is in this paper is to analyse, not the meaning of dignity, but the way in which it emerges in practices where it is pursued, within relationships between people, technologies, places, regulations, and the values cherished by or embedded in them. We show that professional caregivers recognize in the dignity of the person they care for their own dignity; giving up on the one implies no less than giving up on the other. This ‘mirrored experience’ of dignity expresses itself in professional’s engagement with the situation. The value of this engagement, we argue, lies not primarily in realizing the particular content of the values at stake. We point to the importance of engagement itself, even if the values engaged with cannot be realized to the full, and even if competing versions of dignity are at stake simultaneously. In this way the caregivers provide us with interesting examples of moral actorship in situations of conflicting values.

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Section: On Dignitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The particularity of dignity: relational engagement in care at the end of life

Pols

Pasveer

Willems

2017

Med Health Care and Philos

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“…22 This formula grounds the principle of respect for persons. 23,24 According to Byers, 25 the reason Kant established human dignity (respect for persons) as a fundamental, unconditional imperative of morality is because dignity is an intrinsic value of persons as ends in themselves. Dignity designates the value of persons in their own right; it is why a person "matters."…”

Section: Dignitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Dignity designates the value of persons in their own right; it is why a person "matters." 25 "A person's ends, individuality, autonomy, and so on matter because the person matters. This 'mattering' is a person's value, or his or her dignity."…”

Section: Dignitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This 'mattering' is a person's value, or his or her dignity." 25 Rodríguez-Prat and colleagues 26 conducted a meta-analysis of studies addressing patients' perceptions of dignity during catastrophic illness. Some patients reported feeling useless, burdensome, uncertain, fearful feelings exacerbated by loss of physical and personal independence (i.e., increased dependence on others).…”

Section: Dignitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Moral Features of the Therapeutic Relationship with Adults: Dignity, Trust, Autonomy, Vulnerability, and Resilience

Horner

2020

Semin Speech Lang

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Using dignity as a foundational value of morality, this article defines trust, autonomy, vulnerability, and resilience in relational terms. A fictional narrative illustrates these attributes as well as solidarity and care, two core tenets of relational ethics. Medicine and rehabilitation are described as moral enterprises with respect for persons at the core of our professional obligations to patients—namely, duties of care, trustworthiness, and loyalty. Clinically, promoting autonomy, decreasing vulnerability, and fostering resilience are encouraged, with particular emphasis on avoiding words or actions (or inactions) that could cause patients to feel discouraged or depersonalized. In conclusion, the purpose of our work with persons with aphasia and other communication disorders is to help them live their lives as fully as possible, despite their life-changing losses. Viewing our therapeutic relationships with them in relational moral terms can enhance our work.

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“…The papers by Philippa Byers [7] and by Wendy Rogers and Mary Walker [8] focus on some specific vulnerabilities of patients and research subjects. Byers is curious to understand what grounds our dignity-based obligations to those who are vulnerable but whose autonomy has been undermined or lost.…”

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confidence: 99%