Dependent Diplomacy: Signaling, Strategy, and Prestige in the Diplomatic Network

Abstract

Diplomatic recognition is an essential tool of statecraft but remains largely unanalyzed by political scientists. Two recent trends in diplomatic practice raise notable puzzles: (i) use of diplomatic ties to signal (dis)approval of a regime or its policies, based largely on cues from diplomatic partners, and (ii) reliance on diplomatic missions as a means of securing prestige in the international system. I argue that both trends are the result of network influences. States face resource constraints and must choose diplomatic partners wisely, but they lack complete information about the risks and benefits of extending diplomatic recognition. To solve this informational dilemma, they condition recognition on the diplomatic activity of others. First, states send missions to countries that host missions from their own diplomatic partners, which increases the strength of diplomatic signals and reduces political risks. Second, states send missions to countries that host large numbers of missions in general (that is, “prestigious” countries), which increases their capacity for information gathering. In general, a state's decision to extend or retract diplomatic recognition depends heavily on the decisions of other states. Employing novel network methodologies, I show that these endogenous network influences are among the most consistent and substantively powerful determinants of diplomatic recognition.

Network Dynamics and the Evolution of International Cooperation

“…It is by no means the only approach, but it has the great benefit of comporting well with long-standing intuitions about the structure of the international system. The conclusion that network influences reverberate throughout processes of international cooperation complements growing evidence of network effects in international conflict (Ward, Siverson, and Cao 2007), military alliances (Cranmer, Desmarais, and Menninga 2012;Warren 2010), economic policies (Cao 2009), diplomatic representation (Kinne 2014), and elsewhere. The question, then, is not whether networks matter in international politics, but how and why they matter.…”

“…See Snijders, van de Bunt, and Steglich (2010) for a highly accessible overview. In international relations, these models have been applied to military alliances (Warren 2010), preferential trade agreements (Manger, Pickup, and Snijders 2012), and diplomatic representation (Kinne 2014). 30 Importantly, the first observation of the network is not modeled but instead provides the initial conditions from which the network evolves (Snijders 2005). tie is created only if it also increases j's utility.…”

Change we can believe in: Comparing longitudinal network models on consistency, interpretability and predictive power

“…Model specification was inspired by Kinne (2014) as well as by Hollway and Koskinen (2016), to reflect contemporary model specification. As structural effects both models include a transitivity parameter, modelled as Alternating Triads in the TERGM and as geometrically weighted edgewise shared partners (GWESP) in the SAOM, a parameter for preferential attachment, modelled in the TERGM by alternating stars and in the SAOM as a square-rooted Indegree Popularity parameter, and a four-cycle parameter.…”

The effect of diplomatic representation on trade: A panel data analysis

“…6 5 Where the omission of country and bilateral fixed effects leads to overestimation of the effect of the variable of interest. 6 Most variables that could be considered as plausible instruments are at the same time determinants of such policy instruments as well, as is shown by Kinne (2014) in the case of diplomatic representation. Either way, as Baier and Bergstrand (2007) point out, most of the available instruments are less than fully convincing at best.…”