2014
DOI: 10.3923/jas.2014.2487.2497
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Deployment of New Dynamic Cryptography Buffer for SCADA Security Enhancement

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Cited by 10 publications
(34 citation statements)
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“…Due to the evolution of technology, the advanced version of DNP3 provides interconnectivity over the Internet; the information travels through non-proprietary protocols, which reside below DNP3 [5,19]. Due to open connectivity, DNP3 has been vulnerable to Internet attacks; most DNP3 devices are configured, and communicate without any proper authentication mechanism or have little protection in the SCADA network against vulnerabilities [23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30]. Cryptography based security mechanisms [31] have been proposed for DNP3 by DNP3 users group, in which symmetric and asymmetric methods are defined and a detailed description of challenge-response technique is made to examine the security goals (or parameters), such as authentication and integrity, and to protect the transmission against attacks, such as replay, spoofing, and modification attacks [8,32,33], at the application layer.…”
Section: Background Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Due to the evolution of technology, the advanced version of DNP3 provides interconnectivity over the Internet; the information travels through non-proprietary protocols, which reside below DNP3 [5,19]. Due to open connectivity, DNP3 has been vulnerable to Internet attacks; most DNP3 devices are configured, and communicate without any proper authentication mechanism or have little protection in the SCADA network against vulnerabilities [23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30]. Cryptography based security mechanisms [31] have been proposed for DNP3 by DNP3 users group, in which symmetric and asymmetric methods are defined and a detailed description of challenge-response technique is made to examine the security goals (or parameters), such as authentication and integrity, and to protect the transmission against attacks, such as replay, spoofing, and modification attacks [8,32,33], at the application layer.…”
Section: Background Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…More specifically, the DNP3 frames are encapsulated in other lower layer protocols, such as SSH, IPSec, and SSL/TLS [23,41], which protect the sensitive information of the SCADA/DNP3 system against Internet vulnerabilities and attacks [20,39,[42][43][44][45][46][47]. In conclusion, DNP3 relies on other open protocols, such as TCP/IP and UDP, in terms of transmission over the Internet and on protocols (such as SSH, IPSec, and SSL/TLS) for security purposes, but these open protocols (such as TCP/IP and UDP) have several vulnerabilities, and the protocols (such as SSH, IPSec, and SSL/TLS) also have limitations [8,36], because they depend on other security protocols, such as cryptography protocols [19,23].…”
Section: Study Motivationmentioning
confidence: 99%
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