2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2009.01.002
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Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking: Evidence from internal loan ratings

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Cited by 167 publications
(72 citation statements)
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“…In the absence of deposit insurance coverage, monitoring of banks by private parties increases and thus uninsured depositors tend to discipline banks by demanding higher deposit rates (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002;Anginer et al, 2013). Moreover, deposit insurance could also impact the lending rates positively, as bank managers might lend to customers of low creditworthiness suggesting that they would require higher interest rates for the loans provided (Carapella and Giorgio, 2004;Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). This could suggest that deposit insurance coverage might have a positive impact on bank profitability through its effect on interest margins.…”
Section: Deposit Coverage Insurance Ump and Bank Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In the absence of deposit insurance coverage, monitoring of banks by private parties increases and thus uninsured depositors tend to discipline banks by demanding higher deposit rates (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002;Anginer et al, 2013). Moreover, deposit insurance could also impact the lending rates positively, as bank managers might lend to customers of low creditworthiness suggesting that they would require higher interest rates for the loans provided (Carapella and Giorgio, 2004;Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). This could suggest that deposit insurance coverage might have a positive impact on bank profitability through its effect on interest margins.…”
Section: Deposit Coverage Insurance Ump and Bank Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This reduction in interest margins because of the monitoring of depositors could be strengthened for deposit uninsured banks. Moreover, at the presence of lower margins over unconventional monetary policy periods, insured banks are encouraged to relax further their credit standards because of lack of private monitoring and thus increase lending to borrowers of low creditworthiness (Carapella and Giorgio, 2004;Ioannidou and Penas, 2010).…”
Section: Deposit Coverage Insurance Ump and Bank Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…They emphasize the impact of a deposit insurance system on bank asset-side risk. Banks with a high share of large depositors undertook relatively less risk before the insurance system established in the context of Bolivia, but banks appear to take higher risk and do not seem to compensate increasing risk by adjusting requirements for collateral and maturity after the introduction of deposit insurance (Ioannidou & Penas, 2010). This is consistent with the fact that large depositors have greater ability to monitor banks in unguaranteed circumstance as proposed by England (1988).…”
Section: Previous Empirical Evidencementioning
confidence: 58%
“…The empirical results do not support the existence of the risk effects of deposit insurance for the sample given in [5]. While [6] gives the opposite conclusion that deposit insurance significantly increases the credit risk of financial institutions. In fact, the benefit effects and the risk effects of deposit insurance may exist in the same time.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 79%