Der Begriff der Tugend und die Grenzen der Tugendethik

Halbig, Christoph

doi:10.3196/004433016818285953

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this challenge. 3 For this distinction see also Crisp (1996), p. 5-8; Adams (2006), p. 6 f. and Halbig (2013), p. 11. respects just mentioned: What was indeed present in the first half of the 20th century were arguably ethics of virtue of different stripes, be they consequentialist like Moore's or deontological like Frankena's; what was lacking however were prominent examples of virtue ethics proper.…”

Section: Some Distinctions and Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtue vs. virtue ethics

Halbig

2020

ZEMO

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The present article sets out to defend the thesis that among the more or less familiar enemies or challenges an adequate theory of virtue has to cope with is another, less obvious one – virtue ethics itself. The project of establishing virtue ethics as a third paradigm of normative ethics at eye level with consequentialism and deontological approaches to ethics threatens to distort not just our ethical thinking but the theory of virtue itself. A theory of virtue that is able to meet the demands of a full-blown virtue ethics necessarily has to face three fundamental dilemmas and thus seems to fail as an adequate theory of virtue. And vice versa: An ontologically and normatively viable theory of virtue will be unsuited to provide a promising starting point for virtue ethics as the “third kid on the block” among the options of self-standing paradigms of normative ethics.

show abstract

Section: Some Distinctions and Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtue vs. virtue ethics

Halbig

2020

ZEMO

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…2 It is controversial if even this categorization is appropriate (see, for example, Crisp 2015 for an argument that virtue ethics should not be considered as a standalone theory, but rather as a form of deontology), and we have to be aware that considerations typical of one family of moral theories also figure into moral theories that seem to fit in another group. As Christoph Halbig's differentiation between virtue ethics, ethics of virtue, and theory of virtue (Halbig 2013) demonstrates, virtues, as one of the key ethical concepts, can be found in moral theories that belong to very different groups of moral theories. We differentiate between different groups of moral theories in which the several concepts have different weights; although we know that categorizations often involve simplifications and a sacrifice of precision, we can seek out basic assumptions that can be assigned to different groups of moral theories.…”

Section: Moral Metatheorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Interestingly, this connection between the questions different moral theories were built to answer plays a fundamentally different role in the context of moral theories than in the context of other scientific theories: in physics, different questions succeeded each other and led to different answers, but the resultant theories replaced each other. Remarkably, the questions to which moral theories give answers do not turn out to be superseded in this way.18 For discussions of the possibilities and problems of virtue ethics seeAnscombe 1958; Crisp/Slote 1997; Borchers 2001;Halbig 2013;Crisp 2015. Due to the aims of this paper, this is not the place to discuss virtues and their values, as it is similarly not the place to discuss the other aspects of moral theories which we are selecting for discussion.…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

How do moral theories stand to each other?

Guinebert

2020

ZEMO

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Moral theories, such as the variations on virtue ethics, deontological ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism, are expected – inter alia – to explain the basic orientation of morality, give us principles and directives, justify those, and thereby (if all goes well) guide our actions. I examine some functions and characteristics of the extant moral theories from a moral metatheoretical point of view, in order to clarify the generally assumed rivalry between them. By thinking of moral theories in analogy to languages it is argued that different moral theories are neither simply competing nor simply complementary; their respective orientations justify using them, in virtue of the problems they help to solve. But even if considerations about the functionality of a theory and the context in which it is created play an important role, they can neither be sufficient to determine these theories’ relations to one other nor for choosing between them. The challenge is to set criteria for the quality of a moral theory on a moral metatheoretical level and, in particular, to make room for future views on morality.

show abstract