Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusion des kurzen Krieges, 1871-1914. Metakritik eines Mythos

From Balkan Conflict to Global Conflict: The Spread of the First World War, 1914-19181

“…12 12 It has since been established that many European military planners did not expect a major war to be decided in weeks: but the traditional view that statesmen and public opinion underestimated the likely duration of a conflict remains valid (Förster 1995). …”

Organising for War: Strategic Culture and the Organisation of High Command in Britain and Germany, 1850–1945: A Comparative Perspective

“…In turn, the year-long drafting of the plan for a two-front war by Field Marshal Alfred Count von Schlieffen, CGS since 1891 and a prototype of an un-political soldier, took place regardless of an increasing recognition that neither would a future war in central Europe be decided by a short-lived campaign nor would Germany's military and economic resources be sustainable throughout a protracted conflict. 64 Nevertheless, the General Staff's planning remained obsessed by seeking an operational solution to a strategic problem. The trends of depoliticisation and specialisation in the massively enlarged General Staff (1867: 88; 1914: 650) became more and more manifest.…”

The Real Schlieffen Plan

“…Many historians have recently cited Martin Köpke's memorandum of 1895, in which he writes of the severe difficulties of fighting through the French fortification line. 52 This challenge, along with the deadliness of modern weapons, certainly prompted Schlieffen to push hard for a modernization of German heavy artillery. 53 However, although much had been done to improve German artillery by 1905, it was still not enough to break through the French fortress line.…”