Deregulation redux: does mandating access to bottleneck facilities necessarily improve welfare?

Higgins, Richard; Mukherjee, Arijit

doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9551-7

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…2 For instance, using a dataset on state campaign contributions by telecommunications companies in 1 For a general description of the access charge, see Vogelsang (2003) and Rey and Tirole (2007). See also Laffont and Tirole (1994), Economides and White (1995), Hausman (1997), Armstrong andVickers (1998), Ida (2001), Sappington (2006), and Higgins and Mukherjee (2010). Further, see Hori and Mizuno (2006), Mizuno and Shinkai (2006), Ida and Anbashi (2008), and Gautier and Mitra (2008) for the dynamic efficiency of access charge rules.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulated Input Price, Vertical Separation, and Leadership in Free Entrymarkets

Matsumura

Matsushima

2012

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in JEL classification numbers: L51, L13Key words: network industry, access charge, manipulation of accounting, regulation * The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from a Grant-in-Aid for Basic Research from the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science and Culture. Needless to say, we are responsible for any remaining errors.† Toshihiro Matsumura, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan. E-mail: matsumur@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp ‡ Corresponding author: Noriaki Matsushima, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Mihogaoka 6-1, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan. Phone: +81-6-6879-8571. E-mail: nmatsush@iser.osakau.ac.jp AbstractWe examine incentives of bottleneck facility holders to manipulate access charge accounting in free entry downstream markets. We consider the situation wherein one firm holds an upstream bottleneck facility and new entrants use it at the regulated price (access fee) to provide final products. The bottleneck facility holder affects the regulated input price. We investigate how vertical separation affects the incentive for manipulation and the resulting input price. We find that the results depend on whether the incumbent is the Stackelberg leader in the product market. If the incumbent cannot take leadership in the product market and faces Cournot competition, vertical separation reduces the incentive for manipulation and the resulting input price. The opposite result is derived when the incumbent can take leadership in the product market.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulated Input Price, Vertical Separation, and Leadership in Free Entrymarkets

Matsumura

Matsushima

2012

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…2 For example, 1 For the general aspects of the access charge, see Vogelsang (2003) and Rey and Tirole (2007). See also Laffont and Tirole (1994), Economides and White (1995), Hausman (1997), Armstrong and Vickers (1998), Ida (2001), Sappington (2006), and Higgins and Mukherjee (2010). Further, see Hori and Mizuno (2006), Mizuno and Shinkai (2006), Ida and Anbashi (2008), and Gautier and Mitra (2008) for the dynamic efficiency of access charge rules.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%