2008
DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2008.01.004
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Dereliction of Duty Redux?: Post-Iraq American Civil-Military Relations

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Cited by 8 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…In his declaration of the end of the (Iraq war) on 31 August 2010, Obama declared the responsibility of the United States for the stability and leadership of the world through American influence throughout the world. This influence is not confined to the armed forces, preferably it includes diplomacy, economic power, and the power of the US model as well (Hoffman, 2008).…”
Section: International Stability From the Arab Spring Revolutions To mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In his declaration of the end of the (Iraq war) on 31 August 2010, Obama declared the responsibility of the United States for the stability and leadership of the world through American influence throughout the world. This influence is not confined to the armed forces, preferably it includes diplomacy, economic power, and the power of the US model as well (Hoffman, 2008).…”
Section: International Stability From the Arab Spring Revolutions To mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, this change does not in any way mean a full return to the situation that prevailed before the Iraq war, which is practically the critical moment in which the USA's situation declined from being a controlling state responsible for maintaining order and stability to an imperial power willing to change the rules of the game (Hoffman, 2008).…”
Section: International Stability From the Arab Spring Revolutions To mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Episodic spikes in friction from military dissent meant there was a distinct possibility that civilians were wrong and senior officers were protesting to help the country while straining to maintain their professional subordination. If civilians kept winning these types of disputes, if they were wrong too often because they refused to genuinely listen or permit themselves to be persuaded by best military advice, the friction, then, did not indicate healthy civil–military relations—or sound national security decision-making (Desch, 2007; Hoffman, 2008).…”
Section: Civilian Supremacists Versus Principled Patriotsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Huntingtonian objective control model puts the emphasis on civilians providing the military with high-level direction on strategy but allowing it a larger degree of independence in the planning and conduct of military operations (Desch, 2007; Herspring, 2008; Huntington, 1957; Yingling, 2007). By contrast, the “civilian supremacist school,” a prominent subset of the civil–military scholarship surprisingly absent from Travis’s article, advocates for a more intensive yet “unequal” dialogue between civilian and military leaders, with the civilian’s preferences taking precedence over those of the military even on issues below the level of general strategy (Cohen, 2002; Feaver, 2009; Hoffman, 2008; Kohn, 2002). The approach offered by Travis would seem to split the difference between the two schools, by circumcising the objective control to certain kinds of conflicts, while proposing an alternative model of closer iterative civil–military dialogue (pragmatic control) for others.…”
Section: Is “Pragmatic Control” Actually Pragmatic and Practical?mentioning
confidence: 99%