Descriptive behaviorism versus cognitive theory in verbal operant conditioning.

Abstract

The relative adequacy with which descriptive behaviorism and cognitive learning theory can account for the findings of verbal conditioning experiments was examined along with the methodological and epistemological assumptions on which these interpretations are based. Methodological problems associated with the techniques employed for the assessment of mediating cognitive states (awareness) were discussed, and evidence was presented to support the view that "what is learned" in verbal conditioning is awareness of a correct responsereinforcement contingency. The implications of verbal conditioning findings for the more general question of learning without awareness were considered, and it was concluded that the investigation of awareness in relation to other behavior is requisite to the development of an adequate theory of human learning.

Postexperimental Assessment of Awareness in Attitude Conditioning

“…With the small percentage of subjects judged aware removed from the data they found significance in the remaining data. In spite of a substantial literature in verbal operant conditioning (Spielberger and De Nike, 1966) which demonstrates the inadequacy of a single openended question in detecting all the aware subjects, Staats (1969) still defends the validity of his technique for assessing awareness.…”

CONDITIONING AND POST‐HOSPITAL GENERALIZATION OF NONDELUSIONAL RESPONSES IN A CHRONIC PSYCHOTIC PATIENT1

“…It is interesting to note that the return to delusional responding was obtained only after the patient was instructed that the contingencies were no longer in effect, although the tokens had been given on a noncontingent basis long before she was informed. Verbalization of contingencies has also been found to be important in verbal operant conditioning with college students, (DeNike, 1964;Spielberger, Bernstein, and Ratliff, 1966;Spielberger and DeNike, 1966).…”

An Empirically-Based Formulation of Hypnotism

“…Researchers may be able to demonstrate empirically that variations in the definition of the situation produce different attitudes, expectancies, and motivations toward the test-situation and toward the experimental tasks, and that differences on the latter three variables ( different task-attitudes, task-expectancies, and task-motivations) give rise to different levels of response. More concretely, research utilizing the most proficient methods available at present for assessing how subjects construe the test-situation (Spielberger and DeNike, 1966) may be able to confirm empirically propositions such as the following: Subjects, who are more responsive on the three sets of consequent variables when the situation is defined as hypnotism rather than as a test of imagination, view a hypnotic situation more so than a test-of-imagination situation as one (a) in which it is appropriate for them to perform unusual behaviors and to experience unusual effects (taskattitude), (b) in which they will find it rather easy to respond to suggestions and to experience unusual effects (task-expectancy) , and (c) in which they should not resist but instead should try to perform the suggested behaviors and try to experience the suggested effects (task-motivation). If propositions of this type are supported by empirical studies, the variable that was labeled in this paper as definition of the situation could be subsumed under the more broadly-defined variables labeled as task-attitude, task-expectancy, and task-motivation.…”