modestly represents his own writing on moral development as the mere correction and supplementation of Kohlberg's theory. However, this work amounts to much more than that. It contains an independent theory of moral development and, moreover, a more interesting and substantial one than is Kohlberg's. The theory-call it 'Peters's theory', for it ought to be associated with his name-deserves recognition and evaluation in its own right. I propose to outline the theory of moral development implicitly advanced in the writings of Richard Peters.Since Peters has worked on questions concerning moral development and moral education for over twenty years, it is not surprising that his thinking has undergone significant changes. He has become progressively more dissatisfied with Kantian presuppositions and correspondingly more attracted to Aristotelian conceptions of key ideas in the field. In fact, in attacking Kohlberg's dismissal of the notion of the acquisition of virtues from any theory of development, Peters has constructed his own classification of (moral) virtues. The intrinsic value of this classification is debatable [l]. However, it makes one thing clear: moral development encompasses much more than progress in the forms of reasoning someone employs in deciding how to act. It also includes the actual content of the conclusions he reaches, and in addition, the ways he feels and responds to the world and the efforts he makes to translate his judgements and feelings into his everyday instinctive conduct. That is to say, according to Peters, moral development is not only cognitive in a stronger sense than Kohlberg claims; it is also affective and conative. Peters tries to do justice to this (originally Aristotelian) insight into the complexity of moral development in each part of his theory.The distinction between cognitive, affective and conative phenomena is not generally prominent in discussions of moral development. (Peters himself employs it explicitly only in the more particular context of knowledge of other persons [ 2 ] . ) However, though he never says so, it provides the structure which underlies his theory. For he does not only advance an 'affective supplement' to Kohlberg's cognitive theory [3]. He repeatedly insists that it is not enough to explain how it is that someone comes to understand and accept principles of morality: one also needs to explain how it is that people ever act on these principles [4]. It may therefore be useful to reiterate this distinction. By 'cognitive' is meant that aspects of a person (and in particular of his development) comprising the ways he thinks about how to act: his practical knowledge and understanding, his reasoning, his perceptions, judgements, decisions. By 'affective' is meant that aspect of a person (and in particular of his development) comprising his feelings and modes of responsiveness to the world: his emotions, sensations, sentiments, moods, pervasive attitudes. By 'conative' is meant that aspects of a person (and in particular of his development) comprising t...
