Desertion as theft

Abstract

To be effective, an army must contain the extent of desertion among its ranks. This phenomenon rose to particular prominence in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries, with the appearance of the figure of the “citizen-soldier” on the battlefield. This paper offers the first theoretical treatment of the issue of desertion from an economic perspective. Building on the work of Yoram Barzel on the “economic analysis of property rights,” we develop a “desertion as theft” framework. We then test the empirical implications of the framework against qualitative and quantitative evidence from Napoleonic France.

Drafting the Great Army: The Political Economy of Conscription in Napoleonic France

“…Desertion is even more of a threat to an army that relies chiefly on mandatory military service (Piano and Rouanet 2020). Less than fully compensated for their services, and the risk war poses to their lives, conscripts face a higher temptation to “dodge” than do volunteers, whether domestic professionals or foreign mercenaries.…”

“… 8 The punishment for draft dodgers was generally less severe than for those who abandoned their units during active employment (Piano and Rouanet 2020). …”

The Art and Science of Economic Explanation: Introduction to the Special Issue in Honor of Yoram Barzel

“…Piano and Rouanet (2019) develop an economic theory of desertion. They argue that desertion and the institutions historically associated with it are the result of the peculiar transaction costs of enforcing claims over the labor services of the soldiers.…”