Design and Development of Layered Security: Future Enhancements and Directions in Transmission

Abstract

Today, security is a prominent issue when any type of communication is being undertaken. Like traditional networks, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems suffer from a number of vulnerabilities. Numerous end-to-end security mechanisms have been proposed for the resolution of SCADA-system security issues, but due to insecure real-time protocol use and the reliance upon open protocols during Internet-based communication, these SCADA systems can still be compromised by security challenges. This study reviews the security challenges and issues that are commonly raised during SCADA/protocol transmissions and proposes a secure distributed-network protocol version 3 (DNP3) design, and the implementation of the security solution using a cryptography mechanism. Due to the insecurities found within SCADA protocols, the new development consists of a DNP3 protocol that has been designed as a part of the SCADA system, and the cryptographically derived security is deployed within the application layer as a part of the DNP3 stack.

A Secure, Intelligent, and Smart-Sensing Approach for Industrial System Automation and Transmission over Unsecured Wireless Networks

“…SCADA system security issues [ 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 ] have been considered as the most prominent and important counter measures of communication [ 11 , 12 , 13 ]. Therefore, an evaluated potential method is proposed that would be significant to fight against SCADA security challenges; however, security enhancement is limited to specified goals (or security goals).…”

“…To connect the several networks points, SCADA has been employed in various wired/wireless communication media and the transmission can be accessed over modern technology platforms such as cellular phones using 2G, 3G, 4G, and general packet radio service (GPRS) [ 20 , 21 , 22 ]. However, overall SCADA communication is carried out by non-proprietary protocols which are ranked above the SCADA proprietary protocols [ 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 ].…”

“…Typically, the DNP3 protocol design does not deploy the potential security mechanisms such as authentication, encryption, and authorization. Due to security limitations, outside attackers can easily interrupt the DNP3 transmission, or directly target the DNP3 layers including the application layer, the pseudo-transport layer, and the data link layer; and the configured DNP3 nodes are also not able to analyze that the incoming message, and its contents are valid, or have not been changed during transmission [ 11 , 13 , 14 ]. The attack taxonomies for the DNP3 pseudo-transport layer and data link layer are depicted in Table 1 and Table 2 [ 13 ].…”

“…Similar to other SCADA protocols, the initial design of the DNP3 protocol was also limited in terms of security, or the security design was associated with the physical parts of the system [ 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 ]. To fulfill the requirements of industrial processes and automations, SCADA systems are connected to almost all modern networks [ 20 , 21 , 22 ].…”

Security Scheme Based on Parameter Hiding Technic for Mobile Communication in a Secure Cyber World

“…UE refers to user devices such as smart-phones among LTE entities. eNB is the base station [14,15]. eNB provides the user with wireless interface and wireless Remote Resource Management (RRM) features such as radio bearer control, wireless admission control, dynamic wireless resource allocation, load balancing, and Inter Cell Interference Control (ICIC).…”