Design and Evaluation of Memristor-Based Piccolo-80 Lightweight Encryption Algorithm for Future IoT Applications

Abstract

Piccolo is an ultra-lightweight encryption algorithm optimized for very resource-constrained platforms. However, lightweight algorithms are vulnerable to side-channel attacks, specifically Differential Power Analysis (DPA). In this study, we first demonstrate the vulnerability of this algorithm against DPA. Then, a new masking scheme to protect the algorithm against DPA is proposed. In addition, the same implementation in a hybrid CMOS-Nano system is presented and the results are compared in terms of attack tolerance, area, and energy consumption. Power analysis mounted on unmasked Piccolo was successful while the attack on the masked version of both CMOS and CMOS-Nano implementations of the algorithm led to unsuccessful results and no key was recovered. More importantly, while maintaining reliable performance, the hybrid CMOS-Nano circuit was more efficient than the pure CMOS circuit in terms of energy consumption and area. This is a very important issue for future IoT devices and applications where energy consumption and security are the primary concerns.