Proceedings of the 35th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing 2020
DOI: 10.1145/3341105.3373884
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Design and implementation of cast-as-intended verifiability for a blockchain-based voting system

Abstract: Digitization of electoral processes depends on confident systems that produce verifiable evidence. The design and implementation of voting systems has been widely studied in prior research, bringing together expertise in many fields. Switzerland is organized in a federal, decentralized structure of independent governmental entities. Thus, its decentralized structure is a real-world example for implementing an electronic voting system, where trust is distributed among multiple authorities.This work outlines the… Show more

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Cited by 14 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…Although the prototype implementation uses Tendermint's consensus mechanism (requiring at least 2 /3 of all consensus nodes to behave honestly), a suitable alternative is Proof-of-Authority [29], [30]. For instance, in Switzerland, cantons, down to municipalities can participate in the consensus, only requiring at least 1 /2 nodes to behave honestly.…”
Section: B Voting Schemementioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…Although the prototype implementation uses Tendermint's consensus mechanism (requiring at least 2 /3 of all consensus nodes to behave honestly), a suitable alternative is Proof-of-Authority [29], [30]. For instance, in Switzerland, cantons, down to municipalities can participate in the consensus, only requiring at least 1 /2 nodes to behave honestly.…”
Section: B Voting Schemementioning
confidence: 99%
“…AEternum provides IV, since the voter can query the PBB to find out if the ballot was recorded correctly. However, this assumes that the voter's platform is trusted, i.e., not infected with malware corrupting the voter's view of the PBB, and thus, not providing any voting verification mechanism [29]. Malware on the voter's device can intercept all communications between the voter and the DPBB, thereby modifying the voter's ballot and reflecting an incorrect state of the DPBB in order to keep the voter from noticing the modifications.…”
Section: Verifiabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…By combining the advantages of the blockchain with smart contracts, the research community developed a profusion of distributed applications, e.g. a voting system for Switzerland [10]. Involving a trusted third party that punishes malicious actors requires setting up an escrow [11] to draw from if a misbehavior occurs, or a reputation system [12].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…CaIV needs to be addressed, if the voter's platform cannot be controlled and trusted, which is typically the case, if the voter is able to cast an electronic ballot remotely. IV and CaIV together assure that the voter can detect that her vote was compromised, most probably by malicious code on the voting device [11]. While IV, UV, and E2E-V are of central importance for REV schemes, they are hard to prove in combination, but even harder to be deployed within an operational and practical RPV system.…”
Section: Definition 1 Individual Verifiability (Iv)mentioning
confidence: 99%