Design and Implementation of SIP Security

Chang, Chia-Chen; Lu, Yung-Feng; Pang, Ai‐Chun; Kuo, Tei-Wei

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30582-8_70

Cited by 11 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…It recalculates the user's credentials using the user's password stored in the Subscriber table. At this time, the attacker injected query in SIP header will attempt and change the user credentials in the SQL table [15]. It is also possible for a malicious user to attempt to employ SQL [16] commands such that, they make the database service useless and lead to a DoS on the SIP service.…”

Section: A Denial Of Service (Dos) Attackmentioning

confidence: 98%

An Analysis of Security Implications in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)

Behl¹,

Behl

2013

2013 7th Asia Modelling Symposium

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Voice over IP (VoIP) has become an indispensible part of our life as individuals, organizations, and corporate move from traditional Plain Old Telephony Systems (POTS) to VoIP based systems. This allows the cost to make or receive calls come down drastically while the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) for managing a PABX also to be reduced. In this research paper, we explore the plausibility of an attacker or hacker exploiting one of the most popular and commonly used VoIP protocol -Session Initiation protocol (SIP). Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [1] being derived from HTTP has its own share of strengths and weaknesses. While it constitutes the provisioning of critical and business relevant services e.g. IP Telephony, Instant Messaging, Presence, etc., it is vulnerable to well known and not so well known attacks. This research paper identifies and describes security issues significant to SIP protocol that may lead to Denial of Service (DoS) [2], flooding attacks, attacks exploiting vulnerabilities at the application layer and Spam over Internet Telephony (SPIT). In this paper we explore the various security issues pertinent to SIP protocol and diverse ways in which a VoIP system leveraging SIP can be attacked. We also try to explore the most effective methods to thwart or alleviate these attacks.

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Section: A Denial Of Service (Dos) Attackmentioning

confidence: 98%

An Analysis of Security Implications in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)

Behl¹,

Behl

2013

2013 7th Asia Modelling Symposium

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“…, P s ) by using only the shared secret password k. It means that the Client authentication response f (k, realm, P c , s, β, α, P s )} in step (3) and the Server authentication response f (k, realm, P s , s, α, β, P c )} in step (4) just only defend on the password k. Unlike Wu et al's NAKE protocol, in order to overcome the off-line password guessing attacks in the improved NAKE protocol, since the Client authentication response f (k, DH k , realm, P c , s, β, α, P s )} in step (3) and the Server authentication response f (k, DH k , realm, P s , s, α, β, P c ) in step (4) To secure the DenningSacco attacks, we change the session key sk = xyP with sk = f (xyP ) by using secure one-way hash function in our improved NAKE protocol. Then, although an attacker obtains the shared session key sk = f (xyP ), he/she cannot obtain the Client's secret password k from the Client authentication response f (k, DH k , realm, P c , s, β, α, P s )} in step (3) and the Server authentication response f (k, DH k , realm, P s , s, α, β, P c ) in step (4) because f (·) is a secure one-way hash function by Definition 4.…”

Section: Definition 1 (Ecdlp: Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Then, although an attacker obtains the shared session key sk = f (xyP ), he/she cannot obtain the Client's secret password k from the Client authentication response f (k, DH k , realm, P c , s, β, α, P s )} in step (3) and the Server authentication response f (k, DH k , realm, P s , s, α, β, P c ) in step (4) because f (·) is a secure one-way hash function by Definition 4. It means that the attacker cannot get the Diffie-Hellman key DH k = xyP by using the shared session key sk = f (xyP ) because of one-way property.…”

Section: Definition 1 (Ecdlp: Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cryptanalysis of NAKE Protocol Based on ECC for SIP and Its Improvement

Yoon

Yoo

2008

2008 Second International Conference on Future Generation Communication and Networking Symposia

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“…Over the years, a number of authentication schemes aiming to replace Digest Authentication have been proposed, using such basic blocks as Diffie Hellman [211], Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) [212], Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [213], nonces [214], PKI [215], [216] hash functions [217], and others [218], not all of them secure [219].…”

Section: ) Authentication Protocols (15 Items)mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comprehensive Survey of Voice over IP Security Research

Keromytis

2012

IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutorials

116

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Abstract-We present a comprehensive survey of Voice over IP security academic research, using a set of 245 publications forming a closed cross-citation set. We classify these papers according to an extended version of the VoIP Security Alliance (VoIPSA) Threat Taxonomy. Our goal is to provide a roadmap for researchers seeking to understand existing capabilities and to identify gaps in addressing the numerous threats and vulnerabilities present in VoIP systems. We discuss the implications of our findings with respect to vulnerabilities reported in a variety of VoIP products.We identify two specific problem areas (denial of service, and service abuse) as requiring significant more attention from the research community. We also find that the overwhelming majority of the surveyed work takes a black box view of VoIP systems that avoids examining their internal structure and implementation. Such an approach may miss the mark in terms of addressing the main sources of vulnerabilities, i.e., implementation bugs and misconfigurations. Finally, we argue for further work on understanding cross-protocol and cross-mechanism vulnerabilities (emergent properties), which are the byproduct of a highly complex system-of-systems and an indication of the issues in future large-scale systems.

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Design and Implementation of SIP Security

Cited by 11 publications

References 6 publications

An Analysis of Security Implications in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)

An Analysis of Security Implications in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)

Cryptanalysis of NAKE Protocol Based on ECC for SIP and Its Improvement

A Comprehensive Survey of Voice over IP Security Research

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