Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

Abstract

Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postu lated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially-severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. This paper describes a facilities safeguards system suitable for production plant, in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, over riding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely-coupled process streams are protected by on-lir.e NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material bal ances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides an information and actions at the safeguards/ operations interface. The Problem The postulated threat to nuclear materials has grown to the point that extensions of conventional safeguards techniques have become increasingly burdensome. New threats and avenues for diversion are continually being postulated, and incremental exten sions of conventional measures intrude further on plant operations. What is needed is an integrated strategy for in-depth protection of materials in facilities that provides better effectiveness with out unreasonable operational impact.

Fast Breeder Reactor studies

“…(For a detailed discussion of the main techniques that have been used to develop pressure-volume relationships and the corresponding work potential see Ref. 31). If we consider the arbitrary assumption and uncertainty in specifying the source term (the value of the ramp rate at prompt-critical condition), the above codes can be considered well-developed and sufficiently accurate.…”

Structure of safeguards systems

“…The basic management, control, and coordination structure of safeguards systems for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities has been described in several earlier reports. 1 " 7 This report does not address directly the problems of international safeguards or interactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, it should be recognized that the safeguards system structure discussed here would form the backbone of an effective operator's safeguards system in either national or multinational fuel cycle facilities.…”