Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market

Yu, Ying; Jin, Tongdan; Zhong, Chunjie

doi:10.3390/en81212419

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Chen et al (2022a) addressed the issues of privacy protection and user engagement among Internet of Things (IoT) users and designed an incentive method based on Q-Learning, which aims to reduce the flow offset cost and enhance user enthusiasm. Yu et al (2015) created an incentive contracts menu to address the issue of electricity pricing and utilized Q-Learning to evaluate the response of power generation companies to the incentive menu.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A dynamic incentive mechanism for data sharing in manufacturing industry

Liu,

Yu,

Huang

2024

10.5267/j.ijiec

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Data sharing is a critical component in a blockchain traceability platform. Therefore, creating a reasonable incentive mechanism to ensure that all enterprises participate in data sharing is vital for blockchain platforms. Currently, many researchers employ evolutionary game theory to analyze problems related to data sharing. However, evolutionary game theory typically assumes that the population composed of enterprises is mixed uniformly. Enterprises in the manufacturing industry are not uniformly mixed, as they tend to have specific connections with each other due to the size of enterprises and volume of business. Therefore, a networked evolutionary game is introduced to solve this problem. Firstly, an incentive model for enterprises sharing data is established. Then, a scale-free network is employed to simulate the connections between enterprises. To comprehensively consider the individual and group benefits of enterprises in the game, this study designs a strategy update rule for networked evolutionary game based on Discrete Particle Swarm Optimization and Variable Neighborhood Descent algorithm. To tackle the challenge of determining reasonable incentive values in networked evolutionary games, this study proposes a dynamic incentive mechanism based on the Q-Learning algorithm. Finally, the experiments indicate that this method can successfully facilitate the stable involvement of enterprises in data sharing.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A dynamic incentive mechanism for data sharing in manufacturing industry

Liu,

Yu,

Huang

2024

10.5267/j.ijiec

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“…In order to realize the long-term stability of electricity price in the day-ahead electricity market [18][19][20], Ying Yu et al designed an incentive contract menu. In the framework of a one-leader and multi-follower game, a bilevel Stackelberg game model was also proposed to find the optimal incentive mechanism [21]. On the other hand, with the development of power system, the design of power market in the environment of rapid penetration of renewable energy and distributed energy is also concerned [22].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research and Application of Continuous Bidirectional Trading Mechanism in Yunnan Electricity Market

Cheng

et al. 2019

Energies

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To further promote market competition, enrich trading varieties, alleviate information asymmetry, and improve trading efficiency during electricity market reform in China, the continuous bidirectional transaction (CBT) was designed and applied in the Yunnan electricity market (YNEM), which is dominated by medium- and long-term power energy trading. The clearing model for the CBT with the goal of maximum social welfare is proposed in two bidding stages, including call auction (CA) and continuous double auction (CDA). Correspondingly, the integrated two-stage market clearing algorithm is also introduced to ensure the data consistency and business continuity. Finally, the analysis of the practical application shows that the proposed model, algorithm, and various key implementation strategies of the trading platform support the bidding and clearing of the CBT well. In addition, the research and application of CBT may also provide valuable insights for other electricity market construction.

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“…Reference [36] discussed the important role of long-term contracts in the California electricity market. The incentive contract menu proposed in [37] was also shown to stabilize and simultaneously lower the spot price. Therefore, our design aims involve a decomposition algorithm that could improve contract coverage and a settlement rule for the uncovered generation that is accompanied by incentive compatibility, as a means of managing arbitrage opportunities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spot Market Mechanism Design for the Electricity Market in China Considering the Impact of a Contract Market

Zhang¹,

Yan²

2019

Energies

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To promote the reformation of the electricity market in China, a market mechanism that can support collaboration between the contract market and the upcoming spot market was designed in this paper. The focus of this paper was to develop a mechanism to institutionally stabilize the market by way of disciplining market power abuse through limiting arbitrage opportunities generated from multi-markets. To quantitatively describe the arbitrage opportunity, the arbitrage opportunity function (AOF) was defined. Based on inferences of the no-arbitrage principle and the AOF, a cost-based decomposition algorithm for contracts that could improve contract coverage was proposed. The incentive compatible settlement rule for the uncovered generation on the spot market was designed to properly manipulate the arbitrage opportunity. The decomposition algorithm and the settlement rule constituted the designed market mechanism. To verify the applicability and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism, the principles of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and payment cost minimization were employed to test the designed market mechanism based on the concept of dominant policy equilibrium. This test was conducted on a fictitious case based on the IEEE-14 system. The analysis and results may provide valuable insights on market design in China based on the functional correlation between the contract market and the spot market.

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Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market

Cited by 6 publications

References 34 publications

A dynamic incentive mechanism for data sharing in manufacturing industry

A dynamic incentive mechanism for data sharing in manufacturing industry

Research and Application of Continuous Bidirectional Trading Mechanism in Yunnan Electricity Market

Spot Market Mechanism Design for the Electricity Market in China Considering the Impact of a Contract Market

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