Designing and implementing a Malicious 8051 processor

Martínez-Santos, Juan Carlos; Fei, Yunsi

doi:10.1109/dft.2012.6378201

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…There could be several ways to insert and implement hardware Trojans in IPs, depending upon their design, characteristics, activation, and actions. A variety of hardware Trojans submitted in the CSAW Embedded Systems Challenge [63][64][65] held in 2012, have been detected using functional testing, power analysis, and direct analysis of bit-file. A multi-faceted technique to detect Trojans in FPGAs has been demonstrated in [66], where the authors develop a Trojan detection framework leveraging testing techniques to identify different Trojans introduced in CSAW Embedded Systems Challenge.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing

Ahmed

2021

2021 IFIP/IEEE 29th International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC)

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Inestimable appreciation and earnest gratitude for the help and support are extended to many remarkable people who have been around me throughout this journey and without whom the accomplishment of this thesis would not have been possible. I would like to meekly express my thanks to all my colleagues, friends, family, and specifically to those mentioned in the following lines.First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest thanks to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Marco Platzner, for his invaluable guidance, persistent help, and immeasurable support throughout this research. He has always been kind and his generosity, dynamism, sincerity, scholarly advice, and professional attitude have deeply inspired, motivated and helped me to a great extent to complete this thesis. It was a great privilege and honor to work under his supervision where I have learnt a lot from his experience, skills, and leadership. Furthermore, I would like to thank him and Prof. Dr. Sybille Hellebrand for devoting their time and effort to review this thesis, together with all the committee members for evaluating my research.I am sincerely grateful to the people of the CEG for providing such a pleasant and professional working environment during my stay. A special thanks goes to my colleague cum mentor Tobias Wiersema who has been there all the time for scientific discussions in a very professional way and also his help regarding social matters in Germany is highly regarded.Besides, many thanks also goes to

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing

Ahmed

2021

2021 IFIP/IEEE 29th International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC)

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“…Jin et al [21] presented eight RTL HTs to compromise the security of an Alpha encryption module. Santos and Fei [25] presented a backdoor Trojan, a bomb counter Trojan, and a power sink Trojan to weaken an 8051 processor performing RC‐5 encryption. Reece et al [26] presented DoS and data leakage Trojans to attack the Intel 8051 micro‐controller unit, which would probably run a data‐sensitive encryption algorithm.…”

Section: In‐house Design Team Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The competition targets HT design and insertion techniques, Trojan detection approaches, and design hardening mechanisms. Many researchers have reported their Trojan designs implemented for the CSAW ESC competition [16, 21, 25, 26, 73]. Several Trojan design and implementations have been presented by Baumgarten et al [16] at CSAW ESC, including the following: information leakage through RS232 end sequence; RS232 multiple transmission rates; denial‐of‐service (DoS); thermal leakage; information leakage through amplitude modulation transmission; 50 MHz transmission; light‐emitting device transmission.…”

Section: In‐house Design Team Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ten years of hardware Trojans: a survey from the attacker's perspective

Xue

Liu

et al. 2020

IET Computers & Digital Techniques

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In the last decade, hardware Trojan has emerged as a serious concern in integrated circuit (IC) industry. As such, hardware Trojan detection techniques have been studied extensively. However, in order to develop reliable and effective defenses, it is important to figure out how hardware Trojans are implemented in practical scenarios. In this paper, we attempt to make a review of the hardware Trojan design and implementations in the last decade and also provide an outlook. Unlike all previous surveys that discuss Trojans from the defender's perspective, for the first time, we study the Trojans from the attacker's perspective, focusing on the attacker's methods, capabilities and challenges when he designs and implements a hardware Trojan. Particularly, the following questions are explored. What are the current methods and capabilities of attackers after ten years of research and development? By considering more and more sophisticated hardware Trojan detection techniques, what challenges do the attackers face, and vice versa? First, we present adversarial models in terms of the adversary's methods, adversary's capabilities and adversary's challenges in seven practical hardware Trojan implementation scenarios: in-house design team attacks, third-party intellectual property (3PIP) vendor attacks, computer-aided design (CAD) tools attacks, fabrication stage attacks, testing stage attacks, distribution stage attacks, and field programmable gate array (FPGA) Trojan attacks. Second, we analyze the hardware Trojan implementation methods under each adversarial model in terms of seven aspects/metrics: hardware Trojan attack scenarios, the attacker's motivation, feasibility (the practicality of the attacks), detectability (anti-detection capability of that kind of Trojan), protection and prevention suggestions for the designer, overhead analysis, and case studies of Trojan implementations. Finally, future directions on hardware Trojan attacks and defenses are discussed. This paper also presents several new insights and assumptions for the first time, including considering the Trojans not only from the copyright owner's perspective, but also from the users' perspective, and discussing the hardware Trojan attacks in the testing phase and in the distribution phase. This paper can hopefully provide a reference for future works on building effective hardware Trojan defenses.

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Golden-Free Processor Hardware Trojan Detection Using Bit Power Consistency Analysis

Zhang

Quan

et al. 2018

J Electron Test

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Designing and implementing a Malicious 8051 processor

Cited by 8 publications

References 5 publications

Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing

Hardware Trojans in Reconfigurable Computing

Ten years of hardware Trojans: a survey from the attacker's perspective

Golden-Free Processor Hardware Trojan Detection Using Bit Power Consistency Analysis

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