Designing incentives for peer-to-peer routing

Blanc, Alberto; Liu, Yi-Kai; Vahdat, Amin

doi:10.1109/infcom.2005.1497907

Cited by 75 publications

(67 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…EigenTrust [27] is a distributed algorithm for nodes to securely compute global trust values based on their past performance. Blanc et al [5] suggest a reputation system for incentivizing routing in peer-to-peer networks that uses a trusted authority to manage the reputation values for all peers, comparable to our use of directory authorities.…”

Section: Incentives In Other Peer-to-peer Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building Incentives into Tor

Ngan

Dingledine

Wallach

2010

Financial Cryptography and Data Security

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Abstract. Distributed anonymous communication networks like Tor depend on volunteers to donate their resources. However, the efforts of Tor volunteers have not grown as fast as the demands on the Tor network. We explore techniques to incentivize Tor users to relay Tor traffic too; if users contribute resources to the Tor overlay, they should receive faster service in return. In our design, the central Tor directory authorities measure performance and publish a list of Tor relays that should be given higher priority when establishing circuits. Simulations of our proposed design show that conforming users receive significant improvements in performance, in some cases experiencing twice the network throughput of selfish users who do not relay traffic for the Tor network.

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Section: Incentives In Other Peer-to-peer Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Building Incentives into Tor

Ngan

Dingledine

Wallach

2010

Financial Cryptography and Data Security

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“…Several proposals based on such domain model have been introduced [24][25][26][27][28][29][30]. Furthermore, other approaches to build effective incentives schemes are based on the Mechanism Design (MD) and Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design (DAMD) [31] concepts.…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

FairPeers: Efficient Profit Sharing in Fair Peer-to-Peer Market Places

Ruffo

Schifanella

2007

J Netw Syst Manage

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The technical impact of the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) paradigm on content distribution applications has been proved successful and efficient, when participants cooperation is achieved. Conversely, the business model is not clear: given a copyprotected object, its owner must be paid back for each transaction taking place from a provider to a receiver. The P2P paradigm assumes that a receiver turns into a provider, but it is questionable why she/he should provide properly the content, if the owner wants to be reimbursed. Actual systems introduce fairness, giving incentives (e.g., a differential service, like in BitTorrent) to altruistic peers, with the consequence that the owner of an object is economically damaged everyday. Hence, music and film industry sees P2P techniques as a hostile framework for distributing copy protected content for free: today's answer of the industry is investing in DRMbased solutions, that are not interoperable between different devices and players. In this paper, we present FairPeers, a P2P market framework, that joins a straightforward intellectual property protection and a fair economic model by maintaining the efficiency typical of P2P file sharing systems. The study is completed with an exhaustive security analysis, and the description of a prototype implementation that shows that the P2P paradigm is mature enough to present to the broadest community new revenue models, simply using available tools and state-of-the-art techniques.

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“…However, allowing nodes to serve cached objects eliminates this problem and the success rate approaches 100%. The stability of the success rate suggests that the system balances out nicely and obedient nodes do not build up debt over time 4 . Figure 4 shows the number of retries required to successfully find a credit path.…”

Section: System Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…There have been attempts to build a distributed trust management system [1,22]. Blanc et al suggest a reputation system for incentivicing routing in peer to peer networks that uses a trusted authority to manage the reputation values for all peers [4]. Unlike those efforts, our design relies solely on locally observable (and thus more trustworthy) information.…”

Section: Storage Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scrivener: Providing Incentives in Cooperative Content Distribution Systems

et al. 2005

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Abstract. Cooperative peer-to-peer (p2p) applications are designed to share the resources of participating computers for the common good of all users. However, users do not necessarily have an incentive to donate resources to the system if they can use the system's services for free. In this paper, we describe Scrivener, a fully decentralized system that ensures fair sharing of bandwidth in cooperative content distribution networks. We show how participating nodes, tracking only first-hand observed behavior of their peers, can detect when their peers are behaving selfishly and refuse to provide them service. Simulation results show that our mechanisms effectively limit the quality of service received by a user to a level that is proportional to the amount of resources contributed by that user, while incurring modest overhead.

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Designing incentives for peer-to-peer routing

Cited by 75 publications

References 11 publications

Building Incentives into Tor

Building Incentives into Tor

FairPeers: Efficient Profit Sharing in Fair Peer-to-Peer Market Places

Scrivener: Providing Incentives in Cooperative Content Distribution Systems

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