Designing payments for ecosystem services: Lessons from previous experience with incentive-based mechanisms

Jack, B. Kelsey; Kousky, Carolyn; Sims, Katharine R. E.

doi:10.1073/pnas.0705503104

Cited by 634 publications

(420 citation statements)

References 34 publications

(33 reference statements)

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“…For example, one option is to strengthen top down monitoring and enforcement by, for example, by increasing the probability of detection of illegal activity ( in our model), though here weak governance and limited …scal resources devoted to conservation may hamper e¤orts to detect and punish those involved in illegal logging. Another option is to provide district governments with alternative sources of rents (r) -monies, for example, from REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) or PES (Payment for Environmental Services) schemes where district politicians and bureaucrats are, in e¤ect, paid not to cut down tropical forest (see, e.g., Jack et al 2008).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics*

Burgess¹,

Hansen²,

Olken³

et al. 2012

The Quarterly Journal of Economics

335

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Tropical deforestation accounts for almost one-…fth of greenhouse gas emissions and threatens the world's most diverse ecosystems. Much of this deforestation is driven by illegal logging. We use novel satellite data that tracks annual deforestation across eight years of Indonesian institutional change to examine how local o¢ cials'incentives a¤ect deforestation. Increases in the number of political jurisdictions lead to increased deforestation and lower timber prices, consistent with Cournot competition between jurisdictions. Illegal logging and local oil and gas rents are short run substitutes, but this e¤ect disappears over time with political turnover. The results illustrate how local o¢ cials'incentives a¤ect deforestation, and show how standard economic theories can explain illegal behavior.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics*

Burgess¹,

Hansen²,

Olken³

et al. 2012

The Quarterly Journal of Economics

335

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“…However, there is evidence that beneficiaries will not continue to pay for water services unless these investments can be shown to generate and sustain intended benefits (Jack et al 2008;Porras et al 2013). Directly measuring a change in water service delivery through long-term paired watershed studies, evaluation of changing watershed response over time, or comparison among many similar watersheds (van der Velde et al 2013;Carlson et al 2014) is ideal.…”

Section: Implementing Programs For Water Servicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing water services in tropical regions: From land cover proxies to hydrologic fluxes

Ponette‐González

Brauman

Marín-Spiotta

et al. 2014

Ambio

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Watershed investment programs frequently use land cover as a proxy for water-based ecosystem services, an approach based on assumed relationships between land cover and hydrologic outcomes. Water flows are rarely quantified, and unanticipated results are common, suggesting land cover alone is not a reliable proxy for water services. We argue that managing key hydrologic fluxes at the site of intervention is more effective than promoting particular land-cover types. Moving beyond land cover proxies to a focus on hydrologic fluxes requires that programs (1) identify the specific water service of interest and associated hydrologic flux; (2) account for structural and ecological characteristics of the relevant land cover; and, (3) determine key mediators of the target hydrologic flux. Using examples from the tropics, we illustrate how this conceptual framework can clarify interventions with a higher probability of delivering desired water services than with land cover as a proxy.

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“…Payments for environmental services (PES) are a commonly used policy instrument throughout the world to help reach biodiversity conservation goals in agroecosystems (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002;Jack et al, 2008), despite the definition of PES has been for the most part implicit (Sommerville et al, 2009). An effective list of indicator species of distinct facets of biodiversity may represent a key tool to assess the status and trends of biodiversity and to quantify the ecological quality of a field (Wittig et al, 2006).…”

Section: Implementation For Biodiversity Conservationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Indicators for taxonomic and functional aspects of biodiversity in the vineyard agroecosystem of Southern Switzerland

Trivellone

Schoenenberger

Bellosi

et al. 2014

Biological Conservation

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a b s t r a c tIt is widely accepted that the concept of biodiversity embraces two essential and complementary components: taxonomic and functional diversity. Our goal is to produce a list of plant species predictive of high taxonomic and functional biodiversity values and discuss their use within biodiversity monitoring programmes. We selected a representative sample of 48 vineyard areas from Southern Switzerland, and vegetation from the ground cover was sampled from within a total of 120 sampling plots. We considered ten widely used functional traits and selected six taxonomic and functional indices. We applied a two-step analysis: (i) using Threshold Indicator Taxa Analysis (TITAN) based on the above mentioned biodiversity indices, we defined 3 groups of sampling plots with low (L), medium (M) and high (H) biodiversity values; (ii) using the Indicator Value analysis, we identify indicator species that are significantly associated with the above-mentioned groups and their combinations. In total, 259 vascular plants were identified across the sampling plots. As a whole, 52 species were significant indicators for groups with high and mid-to-high biodiversity values. Out of all indicator species, 24 (46%) were exclusively selected by functional biodiversity indices whereas only 10 (19%) were associated with taxonomic indices. Eighteen (35% of the total) species were selected by both types of indices. We point out that indicator species associated with two different aspects of biodiversity show a high degree of complementarity. Our results emphasize the need to consider functional aspects of biodiversity in diversity-conservation strategies when the objectives are to preserve both taxonomic diversity and ecosystem functioning.

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Designing payments for ecosystem services: Lessons from previous experience with incentive-based mechanisms

Cited by 634 publications

References 34 publications

The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics*

The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics*

Managing water services in tropical regions: From land cover proxies to hydrologic fluxes

Indicators for taxonomic and functional aspects of biodiversity in the vineyard agroecosystem of Southern Switzerland

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