Designing Proper Fiscal Arrangements for Sub-Local Decentralization in Montreal

Abstract

The amalgamation and de-amalgamation period in Montreal (2001de-amalgamation period in Montreal ( -2005 led to the creation of a city in 2006 with 19 decentralized boroughs integrated in a multi-tier metropolitan governance structure. Most recent work on Montreal municipal issues has focused on describing its complex governance structures. Very little attention has been given to the new fiscal relations between the City and its boroughs. Because of the extent of its fiscal decentralization process, the case of Montreal raises the question of how far can it go? Using information collected during meetings with elected officials and public services directors in 2012 and fiscal data analysis, we draw some conclusions on the right level of sub-local decentralization for Montreal. Based on efficiency considerations, the evidence suggests that some responsibilities need to be rescaled leading to more centralization. On the other hand, fiscal autonomy, which enhances accountability at the sub-local level, is also a crucial factor that makes fiscal decentralization work.

Urban governance in India

“…In 1992, the 74th Constitutional Amendment formally recognized urban local bodies as the third tier of government and mandated that state governments transfer to local governments a set of specified functions under the 12th Schedule, assigning to them the responsibility for functions such as urban planning, including town planning; regulation of land use and construction of buildings, roads, and bridges; the provision of water; public health; and sanitation and solid waste management. As a result, accountability now rests with the urban local bodies but it is not backed by either adequate finances or the capacity for planning and management (a well-known problem; e.g., see Meloche & Vaillancourt, 2015). State governments have an important role to play not only in transferring functions, funds, and functionaries but also in providing an enabling environment through legislative and institutional reform, whereas the Government of India can only provide strategic leadership.…”

Fiscal federalism and accountability in Nigeria: an ARDL approach

“…This finding also supports the conclusion of Prud’homme (1995) and Tanzi (1995) that corruption may be more common at the local level than at the national level which is the major reason adduced by opponents of fiscal decentralization in developing countries. However this finding contradicts Innocents (2011), Agyemang-Duah et al (2018), Arif and Ahmad (2018), Ewetan et al (2015a), Meloche and Vaillancourt (2015), Zegras et al (2013), Gurgur and Shah (2002), Huther and Shah (1998), Arikan (2004) and De Mello and Barenstein (2001) that fiscal decentralization reduces corruption and promotes greater public sector accountability and government responsiveness to the needs of people in its jurisdiction. The implication of the inability of fiscal decentralization to promote accountability in the long run is that government must adopt appropriate policies to improve BQ, which promoted corruption significantly at 5% level, and strengthen LOR, which reduced corruption insignificantly in this study.…”

“…Findings in the empirical literature on the relationship between decentralization and public sector accountability or corruption are mixed. Some studies find that decentralization promotes greater public sector accountability and government responsiveness, encourages local innovation in service provision, reduces corruption and improves regional balance in development (Agyemang-Duah et al , 2018; Arif and Ahmad, 2018; Ewetan et al , 2015a; Meloche and Vaillancourt, 2015; Zegras et al , 2013; Gurgur and Shah, 2002; Huther and Shah, 1998; Arikan, 2004; De Mello and Barenstein, 2001). Other studies find that decentralization leads to corruption especially at subnational level of governance in developing countries (Bojanic, 2018; Fisman and Gatti, 2002).…”

Reforming Urban Governance in India: A Contemporary Perspective

“…The amendment aimed at devolution of functions, finances and functionaries to ULBs. Enormous responsibilities like preparation and implementation of plans for economic developments and social justice, etc., have been identified for ULBs in the Act, besides the 18 items of responsibilities envisaged in 12 th Schedule of the constitution as legitimate functions of Urban Local Bodies.As a result, accountability now rests with the urban local bodies but it is not backed by either adequate finances or the capacity for planning and management (a well-known problem; e.g., see Meloche & Vaillancourt, 2015). State governments have an important role to play not only in transferring functions, funds, and functionaries but also in providing an enabling environment through legislative and institutional reform, whereas the Government of India can only provide strategic leadership.…”