2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.ipl.2013.01.003
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Desynchronization attack on RAPP ultralightweight authentication protocol

Abstract: Abstract-RAPP (RFID Authentication Protocol with Permutation) is a recently proposed efficient ultralightweight authentication protocol. The operation used in this protocol is totally different from the other existing ultralightweight protocols due to the use of new introduced data dependent permutations and avoidances of modular arithmetic operations and biased logical operations such as AND and OR. The designers of RAPP claimed that this protocol resists against desynchronization attacks since the last messa… Show more

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Cited by 63 publications
(30 citation statements)
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“…Most recently, Wang et al showed that exploiting the property of the permutation and left rotation operations, an adversary can extract the entire shared secrets between the reader and the tag by applying an active attack. On the other hand, Ahmadian et al and Bagheri et al showed that the RAPP is vulnerable to de‐synchronization attack, by applying a similar attack to the one presented in against the protocol in . In addition, it can easily be shown that RAPP protocol is vulnerable to tracking attack that is, do not satisfy the location privacy protection, which can be applied after two successful authentication sessions.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Most recently, Wang et al showed that exploiting the property of the permutation and left rotation operations, an adversary can extract the entire shared secrets between the reader and the tag by applying an active attack. On the other hand, Ahmadian et al and Bagheri et al showed that the RAPP is vulnerable to de‐synchronization attack, by applying a similar attack to the one presented in against the protocol in . In addition, it can easily be shown that RAPP protocol is vulnerable to tracking attack that is, do not satisfy the location privacy protection, which can be applied after two successful authentication sessions.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Illustration and example: Among the most famous de‐synchronization attacks against the ultralightweight protocols proposed in the literature, we cite the attacks described in , , and , against SASI , SLMAP , and RAPP protocols. However, our proposed protocol includes a new mechanism and considers the suggestions in to withstand the two de‐synchronization attacks described in .…”
Section: Security Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [3,4,[8][9][10][11][12][13][14] ultralightweight authentication mutual protocols for RFID systems have been proposed with several variations in design and primitives but cryptanalysis performed in [5][6][7][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30] highlighted the security loop holes and vulnerabilities in the abovementioned protocols. This raises the need of a new secure and robust ultralightweight mutual authentication protocol to combat against all types of malicious activities.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A de-synchronization attack is an intervention by an attacker, who drops or modifies the message between two communication parties [19]. As we are using different keys for each communication without key exchanges between the tag and server, blocking message leads to de-synchronization of key between them.…”
Section: A Performance Against Known Attacksmentioning
confidence: 99%