Detecting Chains of Vulnerabilities in Industrial Networks

Abstract

In modern factories, personal computers are starting to replace traditional Programmable Logic Controllers, due to cost and flexibility reasons, and also because their operating systems now support programming environments even suitable for demanding real-time applications. These characteristics, as well as the ready availability of many software packages covering any kind of needs, have made the introduction of PC-based devices at the factory field level especially attractive.However, this approach has a profound influence on the extent of threats that a factory computing infrastructure shall be prepared to deal with. In fact, industrial personal computers share the same kinds of vulnerabilities with their office automation counterparts. Then, their introduction increases the risk of cyberattacks.As the complexity of the network grows, the problem rapidly becomes hard to tackle by hand, due to the subtle and unforeseen interactions that may occur among apparently unrelated vulnerabilities, thus bearing the focus on the full automation of the analysis. Going into this direction, this paper presents a software tool that, given an accurate and machine-readable description of vulnerabilities, detects whether or not they are of concern and evaluates consequences in the context of a factory network.

Introduction to Industrial Control Networks

“…These methodologies generally focus on detecting chains of vulnerabilities [58] or developing attack trees [59], as overcoming even low levels of security on a network often involves exploiting a series of several vulnerabilities before effecting a meaningful compromise. Such analysis is vital in the formulation of an effective security policy, which is often one of the most difficult aspects of successfully securing a network.…”

Formal Verification of the xDAuth Protocol

“…A portion of the HLPN model shown in Figure 3 is depicted in Figure 4, which represents the registration process of domains on the DS. ∶= sp-cr [10], sp-r [2] ∶= sp-cr [11], sp-r [3] ∶= sp-cr [12], sp-r [4] ∶= sp-cr [13], sp-r [10] ∶= sp-cr [14], sp-r [13] ∶= sp-cr [9], sp-r [25] ∶= sp-cr [24], sp-r [11] ∶= CR − REG − DID (sp-cr [17], sp-cr [10]), sp-r [12] ∶= CR − REG − SK (sp-cr [17], sp-cr [10]), sp-cr [15] ∶= sp-r [11], sp-cr [16] ∶= sp-r [12], sp-ua [1] ∶= sp-r [11], sp-ua [2] ∶= sp-r [12], Sp − Cr ′ = Sp − Cr ∪ (sp-cr [15], sp-cr [16]) ∧ Sp − R ′ = Sp − R ∪ (sp-r [1], sp-r [2], sp-r [3], sp-r [4], sp-r [10], sp-r [13], sp-r [11], sp-r [12], sp-r [25]…”

“…Formal methods have been found to be very useful in the verification of protocols. Formal methods provide techniques and tools for specifying the system and checking the security properties for system verification [15], [16], [17], [55]. Some cryptographic protocols such as Needham-Schroeder, TMN, Kerberos and a formal foundation for web security have been successfully verified using Formal methods approaches, which exposed the security flaws [18], [19].…”

A twofold model for the analysis of access control policies in industrial networked systems

“…In the last years, the security of industrial networked systems (INS) and, especially, those aspects regarding the protection against threats carried out from either their inside or their outside have been receiving increasing attention [1][2][3][4][5][6][7]. Prevention/detection of attacks as well as reaction triggering have been also significantly considered in the scientific literature [8][9][10].…”