Volitional action and self-control-feelings of acting according to one's own intentions and in being control of one's own actions-are fundamental aspects of human conscious experience. However, it is unknown whether high-level cognitive control mechanisms are affected by socially salient but nonconscious emotional cues. In this study, we manipulated free choice decisions to act or withhold an action by subliminally presenting emotional faces: In a novel version of the Go/NoGo paradigm, participants made speeded button-press responses to Go targets, withheld responses to NoGo targets, and made spontaneous, free choices to execute or withhold the response for Choice targets. Before each target, we presented emotional faces, backwards masked to render them nonconscious. In Intentional trials, subliminal angry faces made participants more likely to voluntarily withhold the action, whereas fearful and happy faces had no effects. In a second experiment, the faces were made supraliminal, which eliminated the effects of angry faces on volitional choices. A third experiment measured neural correlates of the effects of subliminal angry faces on intentional choice using EEG. After replicating the behavioural results found in Experiment 1, we identified a frontal-midline theta component-associated with cognitive control processes-which is present for volitional decisions, and is modulated by subliminal angry faces. This suggests a mechanism whereby subliminally presented Bthreat^stimuli affect conscious control processes. In summary, nonconscious perception of angry faces increases choices to inhibit, and subliminal influences on volitional action are deep seated and ecologically embedded.Keywords Cognitive control . Decision-making . Emotion .
ERP . PrimingHealthy adult individuals experience volitional control over many of their actions. This notion is fundamental to most conceptions of morality and responsibility. Voluntary control allows the individual to implement reasoned and flexible goaloriented action rather than being constantly enslaved by automatic responses to the external environment (Shadlen & Gold, 2004). While volitional production of actions has been long studied (e.g., Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983), not much attention has been given to volitional self-control and the role of inhibition in volition (but see Filevich, Kühn, & Haggard, 2012;Parkinson & Haggard, 2014, 2015.Some forms of self-control can be considered tonic-or long lasting-such as refraining from a substance of abuse. This is often colloquially referred to as Bwillpower ( Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998;Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). Other forms focus on more immediate and transient moments of self-control-the notion of Bstopping oneself from doing something at the last moment^-which we call intentional inhibition (Filevich et al., 2012;Parkinson & Haggard, 2014). As an everyday example, consider refraining from shouting at a loved one whilst in anger. Experimentally we define this as endogenously cancelling ...