Detecting Selective Forwarding Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks Using Two-hops Neighbor Knowledge

Hai, Tran Hoang; Huh, Eui‐Nam

doi:10.1109/nca.2008.13

Cited by 71 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Several works [6] [7] that used neighbor-based approach have been introduced in order to mitigate selective forwarding attacks. Lu et al [8] have proposed a neighbor-based monitoring mechanism.…”

Section: ) Neighbor-based Monitoringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detection of Insider Selective Forwarding Attack Based on Monitor Node and Trust Mechanism in WSN

Hu¹,

Wu²,

Wang³

2014

WSN

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The security problems of wireless sensor networks (WSN) have attracted people's wide attention. In this paper, after we have summarized the existing security problems and solutions in WSN, we find that the insider attack to WSN is hard to solve. Insider attack is different from outsider attack, because it can't be solved by the traditional encryption and message authentication. Therefore, a reliable secure routing protocol should be proposed in order to defense the insider attack. In this paper, we focus on insider selective forwarding attack. The existing detection mechanisms, such as watchdog, multipath retreat, neighbor-based monitoring and so on, have both advantages and disadvantages. According to their characteristics, we proposed a secure routing protocol based on monitor node and trust mechanism. The reputation value is made up with packet forwarding rate and node's residual energy. So this detection and routing mechanism is universal because it can take account of both the safety and lifetime of network. Finally, we use OPNET simulation to verify the performance of our algorithm.

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Section: ) Neighbor-based Monitoringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detection of Insider Selective Forwarding Attack Based on Monitor Node and Trust Mechanism in WSN

Hu¹,

Wu²,

Wang³

2014

WSN

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“…Bogus message during reprogramming [28] Unsecure reprogramming process with bogus messages Sinkhole/blackhole [29][30][31][32] Shortest path, drop the packets External stimuli [33] Use external physical stimuli to create a large number of packets Selective forwarding [3,[34][35][36][37] Selectively drop the packets Homing [33] Hamper the normal functioning of cluster heads The node replication [38,39] Add extra node to the network with the same cryptographic secrets Neglect and greed [40] Deny transmission of legitimate packets and give higher priority to own packets HELLO flood [41] Flood with HELLO packets Unfairness [40] Unfair resource allocation on MAC protocols Wormhole [42][43][44][45] Offer less number of hops and less delay, which is fake Sybil [36,[46][47][48] A malicious node pretends to be more than one node…”

Section: Wsn Security Viewing Anglementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The specific form of this attack is the sinkhole or black hole attack with which a node might drop all messages it receives. As possible solutions to detect this type of attack, some secure routing algorithms and IDSs using different techniques have been proposed [3,34,35,37].…”

Section: Selective Forwardingmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Innovative Approach of Blending Security Features in Energy-Efficient Routing for a Crowded Network of Wireless Sensors

Pathan¹

2014

The State of the Art in Intrusion Prevention and Detection

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“…One of the well‐known active attacks in wireless networks is the selective forwarding attack (gray hole attack) , in which the adversary will selectively start dropping sensitive packets, after compromising a node explicitly included on the path of data flow. This attack has been studied in multiple previous works . Yu and Xiao in proposed a mechanism for detecting the selective forwarding attack in wireless sensor networks by using multihop acknowledgment (ACK) technique to launch alarms by obtaining responses from intermediate nodes.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mitigating colluding injected attack using monitoring verification in mobile ad‐hoc networks

Kandah

Singh

Zhang

et al. 2013

Security Comm Networks

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Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) have attracted significant research attention recently because of the fast growth of laptops, personal digital assistant, and 802.11/Wi-Fi wireless networking. However, the flexible deployment nature and the lack of fixed infrastructure make MANETs suffer from a variety of security attacks. In this paper, we show how an adversary can utilize a colluding injected attack (CIA) in MANET by injecting malicious nodes in the network, while hiding their identities from other legitimate nodes. These injected nodes will work together (colluding) to create a collision at an arbitrary node, thus preventing it from receiving or relaying any packet. Because of this collision, a legitimate node could be reported as malicious nodes by monitoring nodes in the neighborhood. In this work, we propose a monitoring verification scheme to mitigate the effect of the CIA attack. Our proposed scheme is able to accurately detect malicious nodes in the network compared with previous detection schemes. Through simulations, we show that our proposed scheme outperforms previous detection schemes in terms of true/false detection of any malicious behavior in the network caused by the CIA attack.

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Detecting Selective Forwarding Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks Using Two-hops Neighbor Knowledge

Cited by 71 publications

References 25 publications

Detection of Insider Selective Forwarding Attack Based on Monitor Node and Trust Mechanism in WSN

Detection of Insider Selective Forwarding Attack Based on Monitor Node and Trust Mechanism in WSN

An Innovative Approach of Blending Security Features in Energy-Efficient Routing for a Crowded Network of Wireless Sensors

Mitigating colluding injected attack using monitoring verification in mobile ad‐hoc networks

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