Detection and mitigation of GNSS spoofing via the pseudorange difference between epochs in a multicorrelator receiver

Shang, Xiangyong; Sun, Fuping; Zhang, Lundong; Cui, Jinlong; Yao-chun, Zhang

doi:10.1007/s10291-022-01224-4

Cited by 20 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…The ML estimation results of the noise code phase are more likely to switch back and forth between -2 and 2 chips. This will improve the MCCPD measurements when only a single authentic ray exists in the received signals [33]. interference-free, and the respective proportions were 20%, 30%, and 50%.…”

Section: A Spoofing Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To pull the tracking loop of the target receiver using spoofing signals, adjustment of the code phase delay of the counterfeit signal is limited [34]. Because the relative delay change of the counterfeit signals is small during spoofing attacks, the mean change in code phase difference (MCCPD) proposed in [33] is used for spoofing detection. The MCCPD is defined as follows:…”

Section: A Spoofing Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To test the performance of the proposed algorithm under combined spoofing and jamming attacks, TEXBAT scenario 2 datasets were added with high-power white noise jamming between 100-150 s. In Fig. 14, the timing bias of the proposed algorithm is shown with red "*" marks, while the result with pseudorange difference between epochs proposed in [33] is shown with blue "*" marks. As the tracking loop lost lock at 100-150 s, the spoofing suppression algorithm proposed in [33] did not have reference in the subsequent time and the timing results followed the spoofed trace.…”

Section: A Spoofing Detection and Validationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A bank of correlators was applied to measure the distorted correlation function, and the line-of-sight signal and multipath were estimated according to the maximum likelihood (ML) principle. Similar to multipath signals, spoofing signals also distort the correlation function, and a multicorrelator structure was used for spoofing detection and mitigation [29]- [33].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [32], signals with longer propagation delays were classified as spoofing, but the algorithm was only useful for mitigating replay attacks. In [33], the pseudorange difference between epochs was used for spoofing validation and mitigation, however, if the tracking loop loses lock, the spoofing validation loses the reference and the algorithm fails. The spoofing attacks are often used with high-power jamming in the initial stage and the tracking loop will not remain locked.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mitigation of GNSS Time Synchronization Attacks in a Multicorrelator Receiver

et al. 2022

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Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) are widely used in various fields to provide highprecision timing. However, their low signal power and open signal structure render GNSS receivers vulnerable to time synchronization attacks (TSAs). In this study, we propose a novel single-antenna-based TSA mitigation algorithm. First, a multicorrelator estimator was adopted to calculate the parameters of the authentic and counterfeit signals. Then, the predicted pseudorange was derived for spoofing validation, and the counterfeit signals were subtracted. Finally, a robust extended Kalman filter was adopted to resist gross errors in the estimation results. A series of Monte Carlo simulations were conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed method with different relative delays and power advantages of the spoofing signals. The Texas Spoofing Test Battery spoofing datasets were used in the experiments to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. The results indicated that the timing errors decreased from 2.0 µs (600 m) to 53.4 ns (16 m), and the spoofing signals were considerably mitigated. The proposed anti-spoofing algorithm can ensure the availability of GNSS timing under TSAs and only requires a single antenna, greatly simplifying the GNSS receiver installation and reducing costs.INDEX TERMS Global navigation satellite system (GNSS), multicorrelator receiver, predicted pseudorange, spoofing mitigation, time-synchronization attack (TSA)

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Section: A Spoofing Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Spoofing Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%