Detection‐based resilient control for cyber‐physical systems against two‐channel false data injection attacks

Abstract

This paper focuses on a detection‐based resilient control issue for cyber‐physical systems (CPSs) subject to false data injection (FDI) attacks, where FDI attacks occur in the communication channels from the sensor‐to‐controller and controller‐to‐actuator. Firstly, to reduce the adverse impacts of FDI attacks on estimation performance, an unbiased estimator is constructed by tackling the equality‐constrained optimization problem. Then, an effective attack detection mechanism is devised by introducing a pseudo‐innovation sequence to formulate the detection function, which can successfully detect two‐channel FDI attacks. Based on these detection results, a resilient controller combining linear quadratic Gaussian and controllers is provided to guarantee the mean‐square asymptotic stability of CPSs with performance. Finally, the validity of the proposed resilient control approach is demonstrated by a simulation involving satellite control system.