Detection of replay attacks in CPSs using observer-based signature compensation

Trapiello, Carlos; Rotondo, Damiano; Sánchez, Helem Sabina; Puig, Vicenç

doi:10.1109/codit.2019.8820639

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…In one approach, the authors have added the watermarking periodically to the control inputs and kept a balance between the improvement in the control cost and the increase in the detection delay [18]. In a different approach, the watermarking signal is added to the observations [20]- [22]. At the receiving end, the authenticity of the observations is first examined and then the watermarking signal is filtered out before using the observations in the controller.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since the watermarking signal is filtered out, the control cost does not increase in this approach. Different kinds of watermarking signals are used in this context, such as sinusoidal [21], time-varying sinusoidal [23], random noise [22], multiplicative to the observations [20], etc. However, these methods may fail in the scenarios, where the attacker hijacks the sensor node and feeds the fake data before the addition of the watermarking.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Quickest Detection of Deception Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems with a Parsimonious Watermarking Policy

Naha¹,

Teixeira²,

Åhlén³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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The addition of a physical watermarking signal to the control input increases the detection probability of data deception attacks at the expense of increased control cost. In this paper, we propose a parsimonious policy to reduce the average number of watermarking events when the attack is not present, which in turn reduces the control cost. We model the system as a stochastic optimal control problem and apply the dynamic programming to minimize the average detection delay (ADD) for fixed upper bounds on false alarm rate (FAR) and increased control cost. The optimal solution results in a two threshold policy on the posterior probability of attack, which is derived from the Shiryaev statistics for sequential change detection assuming the change point is a random variable with a geometric distribution. We derive approximate expressions of ADD and FAR applying the non-linear renewal theory. The relationship between the average number of watermarking added before the attack and the increase in control cost is also derived. We design the optimal watermarking that maximizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence for a fixed increase in the control cost. Simulation studies are performed to illustrate and validate the theoretical results.

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Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quickest Detection of Deception Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems with a Parsimonious Watermarking Policy

Naha¹,

Teixeira²,

Åhlén³

et al. 2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…[13] proposed to destabilize the difference between the estimated and measured output of the systems, while preserving the main system's stability. [22] proposed to use a sinusoidal signal with a time-varying frequency as authentication signal, which was later enhanced by [25] by introducing an observer-based compensation which decreased the performance loss usually found in other watermarkingbased methods. Notably, a few recent works have addressed also the problem of making a control system resilient against replay attacks, see e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detection of replay attacks in autonomous vehicles using a bank of QPV observers

Sánchez¹,

Rotondo

Puig³

et al. 2021

2021 29th Mediterranean Conference on Control and Automation (MED)

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This paper addresses the problem of replay attack detection in autonomous vehicles. Due to the strong presence of nonlinearities, traditional approaches based on linear approximations of the dynamics would not work effectively. For this reason, the proposed approach is based on a bank of quadratic parameter varying (QPV) observers, designed in such a way that each observer is insensitive to a replay attack that affects one specific sensor channel. This feature allows the development of a decision algorithm, whose effectiveness is validated by means of simulation results.

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“…In a different approach, the watermarking signal is also added or multiplied with the observations before the transmission. At the receiver, the authenticity of the observations are first checked, and then the watermarking signal is filtered out before feeding the observations to the estimator or controller [9], [10], [11], [12]. The watermarking signals for the observations could be of different types, such as sinusoidal [9], multiplicative to the observations [10], time-varying sinusoidal [11], random noise [12], etc.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the receiver, the authenticity of the observations are first checked, and then the watermarking signal is filtered out before feeding the observations to the estimator or controller [9], [10], [11], [12]. The watermarking signals for the observations could be of different types, such as sinusoidal [9], multiplicative to the observations [10], time-varying sinusoidal [11], random noise [12], etc. Since the added watermarking signal is removed before the observations are fed to the controller, such methods do not increase the control cost.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sequential detection of Replay attacks

Naha¹,

Teixeira²,

Åhlén³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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One of the most studied forms of attacks on the cyber-physical systems is the replay attack. The statistical similarities of the replay signal and the true observations make the replay attack difficult to detect. In this paper, we have addressed the problem of replay attack detection by adding watermarking to the control inputs and then performed resilient detection using cumulative sum (CUSUM) test on the joint statistics of the innovation signal and the watermarking signal. We derive the expression of the Kullback-Liebler divergence (KLD) between the two joint distributions before and after the replay attack, which is asymptotically inversely proportional to the detection delay. We perform structural analysis of the derived KLD expression and suggest a technique to improve the KLD for the systems with relative degree greater than one. A scheme to find the optimal watermarking signal variance for a fixed increase in the control cost to maximize the KLD under the CUSUM test is presented. We provide various numerical simulation results to support our theory. The proposed method is also compared with a state-of-the-art method.

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Detection of replay attacks in CPSs using observer-based signature compensation

Cited by 10 publications

References 14 publications

Quickest Detection of Deception Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems with a Parsimonious Watermarking Policy

Quickest Detection of Deception Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems with a Parsimonious Watermarking Policy

Detection of replay attacks in autonomous vehicles using a bank of QPV observers

Sequential detection of Replay attacks

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