Determinantes do nível de divulgação das informações por segmento (CPC 22) das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto listadas no IBrX-50

Abstract

Este estudo verificou quais características corporativas são relacionadas com o índice de divulgação (ID) das empresas referente as informações por segmentos requeridas pelo CPC 22. Realizou-se um estudo com dados de 2010 a 2016 de empresas listadas no índice IBrX-50. Aplicou-se um checklist contendo os requerimentos do CPC 22 e utilizou-se uma regressão MQO para identificar as determinantes sobre o índice de divulgação. Foi evidenciado um ID médio total de 57,72%, com média máxima de 86,55% e mínima de 28,59%. As variáveis endividamento, quantidade de segmentos reportados, divulgação primária das informações por região geográfica e clientes significativos foram estatisticamente significantes e com sinais esperados, enquanto as demais variáveis não foram significativas ou tiveram sinais invertidos. Os resultados contribuem para o entendimento do nível de divulgação das empresas brasileiras em relação as informações por segmentos e suscita questionamentos sobre a relevância dos itens de evidenciação requeridos pelo CPC 22.

The efect of size on the relationship between control structure and voluntary disclosure in Brazilian companies

“…The (END) variable is significant at 1% only for large companies, in the three models, with a positive influence of approximately 4.5%. This result is in accordance to the findings of Allaya et al (2018), and indicates that companies that use debt, would show greater willingness to volunteer information to facilitate external monitoring and obtain creditors' confidence (Pontes Nunes et al 2020). The Market-tobook is significant for the smallest companies in the three models.…”

“…According to panel A, the variable (AP) is significant at 1% only for smaller companies (threshold 0), and its positive influence on the voluntary disclosure is (6.45%). This result is related with the findings of Allaya et al (2018), Karajeh (2020), Viana Junior and Crisóstomo 2019and Pontes Nunes et al (2020), who suggests that controlling shareholders would be more concerned with the reputation and legitimacy of the firms and, for this reason, they would be more willing to disclosure voluntary information (Viana Junior & Crisóstomo, 2019). In addition, smaller companies would have less visibility and be less susceptible to political costs, which would encourage disclosure of information to the market (Pontes Nunes et al 2020).…”

“…The excess of control rights would lead shareholders to use private information to capture their own benefits, a situation that is aggravated in environments with weak legal protection (kolsi, 2017), as in the Brazilian reality. The identification of this negative relationship only for large companies can be associated with a greater concern with political costs on the part of this type of company (Pontes Nunes et al 2020).…”

“…market. For example, Pontes Nunes et al (2020) indicate that the concentration of shareholding control would be a determinant of the disclosure of information. However, Murcia and Santos (2012), Kirch et al (2012) and Consoni et al (2017) suggest that the control structure does not influence the disclosure of voluntary information.…”

“…However, large companies would be subject to greater government intervention and higher political costs, which would encourage managers to omit information to draw less attention (Pontes Nunes et al 2020). In addition, for Kirch et al (2012), Murcia and Santos (2012), Consoni et al (2017) and Viana Junior and Crisóstomo (2019) in the Brazilian market there is no significant relationship between the size of the firms and the disclosure of voluntary information.…”