2017
DOI: 10.1590/1982-7849rac2017160053
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Determinantes dos Papéis dos Conselhos de Administração de Empresas Brasileiras

Abstract: Resumo O presente estudo analisa a relação entre os papéis gerencial e supervisório dos Conselhos de Administração de 108 empresas listadas no Novo Mercado da BM&FBovespa e as variáveis de governança corporativa reportadas pela literatura acadêmica que, potencialmente, possam interferir na dominância de cada função nas reuniões dos Conselhos. A determinação do papel foi realizada por análise de conteúdo, adaptando o modelo de Schwartz-Ziv e Weisbach (2013), enquanto a avaliação das determinantes foi realiz… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
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“…According to Dey (2008), CEO duality can lead to decisions not in the interests of shareholders, reduce monitoring and hide important information from other board members. To avoid this problem, the person who is responsible for decision making (the CEO) should be different from the person who monitors it (the board of directors) (Freitas Neto and Mol, 2017). Duality can reduce the intention to voluntarily disclose information because according to the theory of agency, it is difficult for a board to perform its functions when the company does not have an independent leader (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008).…”
Section: Environmental Disclosurementioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to Dey (2008), CEO duality can lead to decisions not in the interests of shareholders, reduce monitoring and hide important information from other board members. To avoid this problem, the person who is responsible for decision making (the CEO) should be different from the person who monitors it (the board of directors) (Freitas Neto and Mol, 2017). Duality can reduce the intention to voluntarily disclose information because according to the theory of agency, it is difficult for a board to perform its functions when the company does not have an independent leader (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008).…”
Section: Environmental Disclosurementioning
confidence: 99%